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REMEMBERING THE "OLD WORLD"
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR GRANO
Yale Kamisar*
When I graduated from high school in 1961, the "old
world" of criminal procedure still existed, albeit in its
waning days; when I graduated from law school in 1968,
circa the time most of today's first-year law students were
arriving on the scene, the "new world" had fully dislodged
the old. Indeed, the force of the new world's revolutionary
impetus already had crested.
Some of the change that the criminal procedure revolution
effected was for the better, but much of it, at least as some
of us see it, was decidedly for the worse. My students,
however, cannot make the comparison; to them the old
world has no flesh, and the new world is all they know.
For those to whom a world without Miranda is as antiquar-
ian as a world without satellites or video cassette recorders,
the question of whether we made wrong choices, or of
whether we should re-embrace some of what we so precipi-
tously and often casually discarded, does not call for
serious analysis.'
Although, as will soon become clear, I disagree with much of
what Professor Joseph Grano had to say in his introductory
essay2 to the Truth in Criminal Justice Series-eight Reports
on various aspects of constitutional criminal procedure issued
by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy-I share his
view that the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
rendered an important service by publishing the Reports in
their entirety.3 And I am sure Professor Grano agrees with
* Henry King Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B.,
New York University, 1950; LL.B., Columbia University Law School, 1954.
1. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 395-97 (1989) [hereinafter Grano, Introduction]
(footnotes omitted). The only specific example of a change "for the better" cited by
Grano is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See id. at 396 n.5.
2. See supra note 1.
3. Truth in Criminal Justice Series, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989).
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me (although he will agree with little else that I have to say)
that the Journal made another important contribution to the
national debate over the quality and future development of
American criminal justice by inviting and publishing
responses to some of the Reports by three of the more prolific
and most insightful commentators on criminal procedure:
Donald Dripps, James Tomkovicz, and Larry Yackle.
Working in a crisp, trenchant manner that readers of his
work have come to expect, Professor Dripps explores the
differences that divide liberal and conservative commentators
on criminal procedure, questions the premises on which each
group of commentators relies, explains his disquiet with the
view that "original-meaning jurisprudence" should guide
criminal procedure doctrine, and maintains that the overriding
concern in this area should be "protect[ing] individuals'
interest in freedom from unjust punishment, rather than any
abstract interest in truth for its own sake."4 Although Dripps
forcefully criticizes Grano and other "conservative thinkers" in
the field, he does so primarily on different grounds, or in a
different way, than I do.
Professor Tomkovicz has emerged as the leading commenta-
tor on, and the most powerful champion of, the Massiah5
doctrine, a rule supplementing Miranda and one that became
a much more potent force under the Burger Court than it had
ever been in the Warren Court era. In his current Article,6
Tomkovicz explores the use of rhetoric in scholarship and
presents a vigorous defense of Massiah in the face of a heavy
attack by the Office of Legal Policy. He regards the debate
over Massiah as one that concerns the resources and capabili-
ties of an individual accused of crime within an adversarial
system. He maintains that "[i]f adversary system fair play
requires trial counsel to be a multipurpose equalizer, then a
modern criminal justice system that has expanded the
adversary contest into pretrial realms must expand the
entitlement to assistance into those realms to ensure the
preservation of fair play values."7
Author of one of the most thoughtful and illuminating books
4. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified
Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591 (1990).
5. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
6. Tomkovicz, The Truth About Massiah, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 641 (1990).
7. Id. at 682.
538 [VOL. 23:4
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ever written on this difficult subject,8 Professor Yackle
vigorously challenges the Office of Legal Policy claim that the
best solution to the problems of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction would be its abolition as a postconviction remedy
for state prisoners.9 He identifies the fundamental role of the
Bill of Rights in the American political order and places
federal habeas corpus within that framework, rejects argu-
ments that the habeas jurisdiction overburdens federal dockets
with stale claims, and criticizes the Office of Legal Policy,
inter alia, "for linking its assault on the writ to Supreme
Court precedents that cannot be fully explained by references
to the Report's perspective on the criminal justice system." °
I agree with much of what Professors Dripps, Tomkovicz,
and Yackle have to say and I am tempted to spell out why.
But they will have to speak for themselves-and they do so
very well. I have taken on a different assignment. The
Journal has asked me to respond to Professor Grano and I
have been unable to resist the opportunity to do so.
Mapp"1 and Miranda2 have not fared as well as their sup-
porters hoped, but better than they feared. So far they have
survived. Where there is life there is hope-hope that
someday the Court will "reclaim the Warren Court's torch." 3
Professor Grano wants to dash that hope.
He does not want the Rehnquist Court merely to contin-
ue to "chip away" at Mapp and Miranda. He wants the
Court to smash these landmark cases' 4-and to bury the
8. L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES (1981).
9. Yackle, Form and Function in the Administration of Justice: The Bill of Rights
and Federal Habeas Corpus, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 685 (1990).
10. Id. at 732.
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949)),
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436 (1966).
13. See infra note 15.
14. Actually Grano not only wants the Court to overrule Mapp, but (as does the
Office of Legal Policy Report he endorses) to abolish the 75-year-old "fourth
amendment exclusionary rule" (or "federal exclusionary rule") as well, i.e., the rule
barring the use of illegally obtained evidence in federal prosecutions. See Grano,
Introduction, at 411-13 (discussing his and the Office of Legal Policy's unhappiness
with the exclusionary rule); see also id. at 423 (contemplating a "new world" of
criminal procedure without, inter alia, Miranda or the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule). If, as Grano maintains, "Mapp helped to set the stage for the
gradual displacement of truth as the primary goal of American criminal procedure,"
id. at 395-96 n.3, the federal exclusionary rule helped set that stage much earlier.
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule was not an "innovation" of the Warren
Court, but a rule established by the White Court, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
539SUMMER 1990]
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pieces. 15 There is a chance that his wish may be fulfilled.
In the last few years three new Justices have been appointed
to the Supreme Court: Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and
David Souter. In their short time on the Court, neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice Kennedy has given any reason to
believe that he is enamored of the Warren Court's "revolution"
in American criminal procedure. Nor, when he was a state
383 (1914), and reaffirmed by the Taft, Hughes, Stone, and Vinson Courts. Among
its supporters were such luminaries as Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter. See, e.g.,
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.) ("The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used-before the Court but that it shall
not be used at all.").
Although in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court, per Frankfurter, J.,
declined to impose the exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of constitutional
law, it did say of the federal exclusionary rule: "Since [Weeks] it has been frequently
applied and we stoutly adhere to it." Id. at 28. Moreover, although Justice Jackson
sided with Frankfurter in Wolf, in another case decided the same day he underscored
the need for the federal exclusionary rule, seeing no "inconsistency" in adhering to
the federal rule, yet leaving the states free to adopt or reject the rule. See Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Although the Mapp Court, the Court that overruled Wolf, was a. divided one, as
Professor Telford Taylor has pointed out:
[That division] did not concern the merits of the exclusionary rule. The
disagreement concerned only the [fourteenth amendment] question: should the
states be left free to apply or not to apply the exclusionary rule according to
state law? That is the issue on which the justices divided, and there is not a
word in [Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion] suggesting that the rule is
intrinsically bad.
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20-21 (1969).
A constitutional rule mandating the exclusion of evidence in state cases was not
a feature of the "old world" of criminal procedure, but the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule definitely was. Nevertheless, because Grano often treats the Mapp
rule and the federal exclusionary rule interchangeably, I shall do the same for the
purposes of this Article. But there is a difference, one that Grano sometimes,
overlooks. Thus, in assailing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule he observes:
"Under our federal system.., one would have thought that [weighing the costs and
benefits of excluding illegally seized evidence] was a question for the state courts to
decide for themselves." Grano, Introduction, at 411. This may be a reason to
overrule Mapp, but not to overrule Weeks.
15. Professor Grano observes:
[A] considerable amount of chipping away at existing doctrine.., has occurred,
but most of the primary precedent remains in place, waiting in repose for a
Court with an inclination to repair the minor damage and reclaim the Warren
Court's torch. Overruled cases are difficult, though by no means impossible, to
disinter, but cases that merely distinguish previous cases, especially when done
unconvincingly, are themselves easy to distinguish away.
Grano, Introduction, at 401.
At another point, Grano comments: "Despite the importance of stare decisis, the
danger that a future Court will build upon Miranda's premises is just one reason why
the Report is correct in suggesting that the Department of Justice should work to
have Miranda overruled." Id. at 408 n.56 (citation omitted).
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judge, did the newest Justice, Souter, display any enthusiam
for that "revolution."
16
Moreover, now that Justice William Brennan has left the
Court, no member of the Mapp or Miranda majorities still sits.
The departure of Justice Brennan signifies more than one less
vote for Mapp and Miranda. Brennan was widely regarded as
the leading voice of liberalism on the Court and (a view held
by many of his critics as well as his admirers) as one of the
most influential and effective Justices in the Court's history.
At this crucial time, Professor Grano's attack on the Warren
Court should not go unanswered. At first blush, at least, his
arguments seem so powerful and so persuasive (at least they
are likely to seem so to those unfamiliar with the pre-Warren
Court era, the "old world" of criminal procedure) that they
cannot be ignored.
The problems of search and seizure and confessions have
been with us for a long time. Indeed, so much has been said
about these subjects in the last forty years that it is hard to
say anything new (although that has not deterred many of
us).'7 But because so much has been said about these sub-
jects it may be useful to recall what has been said that is of
value. The judgments that constitutional criminal procedure
issues require "are too large, too ungoverned by a commanding
text or clear institutional dictates, to be laid solidly to
rest"1 -- especially in these portentous times.
IMPEDING THE "SEARCH FOR TRUTH"
In his introductory essay, Professor Grano looks back on the
"old world" of criminal procedure, the pre-Warren Court era,
with considerable fondness. I do not. Grano bemoans the fact
16. For the view that, while a state judge, Justice Souter gave Miranda an unduly
narrow reading, see my comments on his opinion in State v. Lewis, 129 N.H. 787, 533
A.2d 358 (1987), in Constitutional Law Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272, 2277 (Nov. 6,
1990) (reporting comments made at a conference held Sept. 14-15, 1990).
17. Few criminal procedure professors remember or take seriously the warning
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo issued 65 years ago: "To what [has been] written [about
the exclusionary rule], little of value can be added." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). Of course, in this very opinion Cardozo proceeded to
write some of the most memorable lines ever written on the subject.
18. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
353 (1974).
SUMMER 1990] 541
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that the Warren Court seemed to forget that the search for
truth is the primary goal of American criminal procedure. I
would put it somewhat differently-the Warren Court remem-
bered that the ascertainment of truth is not the only goal of
American criminal procedure.' 9
Grano quotes with approval an observation by Roscoe Pound:
"Legal procedure is a means, not an end; it must be made
subsidiary to the substantive law as a means of making that
law effective in action."2 ° I would agree that criminal proce-
dure is a means, not an end, but add: therefore, it must be
made subsidiary to the values and principles found in the Bill
of Rights as a means of making those constitutional provisions
effective in action.
There is nothing new or unusual about subordinating the
search for truth to other values and policies. As Charles
McCormick, one of our greatest commentators on the law of
evidence, once observed, the privileges that shield confidential
communications between attorney and client, husband and
wife, physician and patient, and priest and penitent (and, one
might add, the identity of the police informant)--
do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but
rather they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the
protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or
wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to
justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed
in the administration of justice.2 '
If the sentiment of loyalty that attaches to the attorney-
client privilege, or the desire to promote full disclosure by the
client, overrides the search for truth, what is so bizarre about
regarding fourth amendment values and policies as more
19. As Justice Brennan pointed out in one of his last criminal procedure opinions
(and, happily, one for a majority of the Court), "various constitutional rules limit the
means by which the government may conduct [the] search for truth in order to
promote other values embraced by the Framers and cherished throughout our
Nation's history." James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 651 (1990); see also Tomkovicz,
supra note 6, at 682 & n.209.
20. Grano, Introduction, at 402-03 (quoting Pound, The Canons of Procedural
Reform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926)).
21. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 152 (1st ed. 1954). As far back as the reign of
Elizabeth I, Wigmore tells us, the attorney-client privilege, the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications, "already appears as unquestioned." 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (3d ed. 1940).
[VOL. 23:4542
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important than the ascertainment of truth? If the search for
truth may be obstructed in the name of an attorney-client or
marital relationship, what is so odd about doing so in the
name of constitutional guarantees?
Professor Grano assails Miranda and its progeny for disre-
garding the value of truth in the confession context.22 He
has considerably more affection for the due process "totality of
the circumstances"-"voluntariness" test than he does for
Miranda.23 But the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test also
"impede[d] the search for truth."24 "Even the earliest [invol-
untary confession] cases adumbrate an enlarged test of due
process transcending the simple one of untrustworthiness."25
As the voluntariness test developed over the years, and it
became increasingly clear that the Court was applying a
"police methods" as well as a "trustworthiness" rationale,26
the concern that an "involuntary" or "coerced" confession was
likely to be unreliable became less important. On the eve of
Miranda, as Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer
noted at the time, although the concern about unreliability
"still exert[ed] some influence" in involuntary confession cases,
it had "ceased to be the dominant consideration."27
22. See Grano, Introduction, at 404-05.
23. See id. at 397-408.
24. Id. at 404 (quoting from the Executive Summary of the OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 1,
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986),
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT NO. 1, PRETRIAL
INTERROGATION]).
25. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 665 (1966) (pre-Miranda); see also Allen, The Supreme
Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REV. 213,
235 (1959); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L.
REV. 411, 418-19 (1954).
In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) and two companion cases, the Court, per
Frankfurter, J., reversed three convictions without disputing the accuracy of Justice
Jackson's protest that "[cihecked with external evidence, they [the confessions in each
case] are inherently believable, and were not shaken as to truth by anything that
occurred at the trial." Id. at 58. And three years later, in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), relying heavily on the rationale of the coerced confession cases to
exclude evidence produced by "stomach pumping," the Court, per Frankfurter, J.,
emphasized that involuntary confessions "are inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established
as true." Id. at 173.
26. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 423-
25 (7th ed. 1990) (collecting authorities).
27. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 10 (1967) (based on lecture delivered
before Miranda). "Indeed," added Justice Schaefer, "the Supreme Court has
sometimes insisted upon the exclusion of confessions whose reliability was not at all
543SUMMER 1990]
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Professor Grano does say: "Of course, if the Constitution
actually required [impediments to truth], the sacrifice of truth
would have to be accepted as necessary to further the compel-
ling goal of constitutional compliance." 2' And he might argue
that the Constitution actually requires the exclusion of a
coerced confession in a criminal case, even one whose reliabili-
ty is not in doubt, because the Constitution contains a specific
prohibition against compelling a person to be "a witness
against himself" in "any criminal case."29
But this argument will not succeed. The pre-Miranda due
process "voluntariness" doctrine was not based on the self-
incrimination clause and the courts that applied and devel-
oped this test did so without regard to the privilege against
self-incrimination. The privilege might as well not have been
there.
The privilege against self-incrimination was not deemed
applicable to the states until 196430 and by that time the Su-
preme Court had decided some thirty state confession cases
without it. Moreover, even if the privilege had been deemed
applicable to the states, the law governing "coerced" or
"involuntary" confessions still would have developed without
it. For until the Court decided Miranda,31 the case that
in doubt." Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
Perhaps the most emphatic statement of the point that the untrustworthiness of
an "involuntary" confession is not (or was no longer) the principal reason for
excluding it may be found in one of Justice Frankfurter's last opinions on the subject,
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). In that case, the Court informed us that
the admissibility of an involuntary confession must be determined "with complete
disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth" and that "a legal
standard which took into account the circumstances of probable truth or falsity...
is not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause . . " Id. at 543-44.
28. Grano, Introduction, at 404 (emphasis added).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
31. "The crux of Miranda," as Professor Stephen Schulhofer has noted, "was not
so much the now-famous warnings but rather the Court's holding that: 'all the
principles embodied in the [Fifth Amendment] privilege apply to informal compulsion
exerted by law enforcement officers during in-custody questioning .... '" Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 878 (1981) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966)).
As for the Miranda warnings, as Professor Schulhofer has pointed out elsewhere:
If the [Miranda] Court was correct in the [earlier steps] of its analysis, and I
submit that it was, then far from handcuffing the police, the warnings work to
liberate the police. Miranda's much-maligned rules permit the officer to
continue questioning his isolated suspect, the very process that the Court's
[earlier analysis] found to be a violation of the fifth amendment.
... [W]hether or not they went far enough, Miranda's warnings unquestion-
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troubles Grano so much, the prevailing view was that the
privilege did not apply to custodial interrogation.32
The cramped reading of the privilege that prevailed in the
"old world" of criminal procedure does not seem persuasive
today. As California Chief Justice Roger Traynor observed on
the eve of Miranda: "It is casuistic to pretend that because
the police have no legal authority to compel statements of any
kind, there is nothing to counteract and hence no need of a
privilege against self-incrimination during police interroga-
tion."33 Nevertheless, for many decades this kind of legal
reasoning had kept the privilege outside the stationhouse.
Thus, as late as the spring of 1966 one could still say, as Chief
Justice Traynor did, that "[t]he fifth amendment has long been
the life of the party in judicial or legislative proceedings, but
it has had no life it could call its own in the prearraignment
stage."34
The courts that applied the "voluntariness" test in the
decades preceding Miranda did believe that the Constitution
actually compelled (a) the exclusion of "involuntary" confes-
sions and (b) the reversal of convictions based on such
confessions-but they thought that such results were com-
pelled by what might be called "straight due process," not by
the privilege against self-incrimination.35  These courts
"appl[ied] the Due Process Clause to its historic function of
ably serve-and from the outset were designed to serve-the function of
permitting custodial interrogation to continue. Indeed, the Court would have
incurred far more police criticism if it had remained within a narrow conception
of the judicial role, pronounced interrogation "inherently compelling," and then
left law enforcement officials to guess about what countermeasures would keep
police on the safe side of the constitutional line.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 454 (1987) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda]; see also Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the
Backseat of a Police Squad Car, 70 B.U.L. REV. 543, 586-87 (1990).
32. See generally Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 25-38 (A. Howard
ed. 1965).
33. Traynor, supra note 25, at 674 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id.
35. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.)
(fourteenth amendment due process cases "have made clear that convictions following
the admission ... of confessions which are involuntary ... cannot stand"; "in many
of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to
reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions obtained by impermissible
methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the
defendant had confessed"); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944) (Black,
J.) ("The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of
any individual in an American court by means of a coerced confession.").
SUMMER 1990] 545
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assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed or
life is taken"3 6--without regard to how "relevant and credi-
ble" the evidence produced by unconstitutional police methods
might be.37
If a confession had been obtained by police methods that
rendered it involuntary-and thus violated due process-it had
to be excluded, however verifiable, and if the trial court had
not done so the conviction could not stand." It was that
simple. (But why isn't it that simple when physical evidence
is obtained in violation of due process because the police have
failed to comply with the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure?)
39
No doubt the many trial courts that excluded "involuntary"
but reliable confessions and the many appellate courts that
reversed convictions based on such confessions assumed that
36. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.).
37. As the Court, per Frankfurter, J., pointed out in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S:
165, 172-73 (1952): "It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is
heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained.
This was not true even before the series of recent cases enforced the constitutional
principle that the States may not base convictions upon confessions, however much
verified, obtained by coercion." See also supra note 35.
38. See supra notes 35 & 37.
39. Although it had refused to vindicate Dr. Wolfs rights in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), by reversing his conviction, "the Court had apparently treated the
police behavior [that turned up the evidence] in Wolf as violating the defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment rights; that is to say, 'rights basic to a free society' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' had been invaded." Allen, Federalism and
the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9. Although the
type of illegal search that occurred in Wolf is not described, let alone discussed, it
appears to have been a "routine" rather than an "aggravated" one. See Kamisar, Wolf
and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43
MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1101-02 (1959).
It is now, and has long been, clear that the Court does not apply a "watered-down"
version of the fourth amendment to the states, but one whose scope applies to the
states via the fourteenth amendment to the same extent it applies to the federal
government. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963). But I have
always thought that, although it declined to impose the exclusionary rule on the
states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process, Wolf equated the
substantive protection against unreasonable searches and seizures provided by the
fourteenth amendment with the specific guarantees of the fourth. See the detailed
discussion in Kamisar, supra, at 1101-08.
A decade after Wolf, Justice Frankfurter protested that that case did not mean
that every search or seizure violative of the fourth amendment would make the same
conduct on the part of state officials a violation of the fourteenth amendment. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 233, 237-40 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). But even before Mapp, most members of the Court disagreed; they read Wolf
as applying the substantive scope of the fourth amendment in its entirety to the
states. See Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Elkins, id. at 212-15. See also
Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-51 (1961).
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such consequences were self-evident or inescapable. But they
are not. Such results are not "actually compelled" by the
Constitution, if one means by that term explicitly or necessari-
ly required by the Constitution.
The "voluntariness" test and its accompanying baggage is as
much a "judge-made" or "judicially created" doctrine as is the
search and seizure exclusionary rule. The Constitution does
not specifically mention "confessions" or "admissions," neither
"involuntary" nor any other kind. Nor does the document say
explicitly that a conviction based on an "involuntary" confes-
sion cannot stand.4° It certainly does not say that a convic-
tion resting in part on a coerced confession cannot stand
regardless of how much untainted evidence remains to support
the conviction.4'
40. See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 805-06 (1970):
In 1936 [the year the Court decided its first state coerced-confession case, Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), holding that a conviction based on an
"involuntary" confession denied the defendant due process of law,] it was far
from evident why the due process clause required anything more of state
criminal procedings than a regular and fair trial, giving the defendant a regular
and fair opportunity to contest his guilt under state evidentiary rules, including
the rule which the Supreme Court of Mississippi held allowed admission of the
Brown confessions.
Although there is (or at least until recently there was) wide agreement that the
'due process"-"voluntariness" test started out as a rule protecting against the danger
of untrustworthy confessions, see, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.2(b) (1984); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at 225; 3 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 21, at § 822, in Colorado v. Connelly, the Court, per Rehnquist, C.J., made
the surprising statements that all the state confession cases the Court had considered
in the last 50 years 'have focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching,"
that the purpose of excluding confessions is to 'substantially deter future violations
of the Constitution," and that even though a confession made by someone in
defendant's condition 'might be proved to be quite unreliable.., this is a matter to
be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum . . .and not by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 479 U.S. 157, 163, 166-67 (1986) (upholding
the admissibility of a confession made by a mentally ill person). Although this view
of the "voluntariness" test strengthens my argument, I cannot believe that the Court
will adhere to this view in future cases. Nor should it. '[A] total
deconstitutionalization of traditionally important reliability issues is unjustified."
Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court
Terms, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 231, 276 (1988); see also Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The
Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U.L.Q.
59, 136-37 (1989).
41. This rule, the so-called 'rule of automatic reversal," has governed coerced-
confession cases '[a]t least since Malinski v. New York [324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945)]."
Allen, supra note 39, at 45; see also, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-19
(1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
599 (1948). Among other things, the rule is designed to discourage the prosecution
from supplementing other evidence by introducing a confession of questionable
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If the confession it produces turns out to be a trustworthy
one, coercion does advance the search for truth at trial.
Why can't the criminal justice system make use of an "invol-
untary" confession if it is so impressively corroborated that
there is no doubt about its trustworthiness? In theory, at
least-the same theory that critics of the search and seizure
exclusionary rule are quick to invoke-permitting the use of
such confessions would not leave the guaranty against
unconstitutional police interrogation methods without alterna-
tive means of protection. Putting aside consideration of
"judicial integrity," which critics of the search and seizure
exclusionary rule do, why are the alternatives to barring the
use of a trustworthy but "involuntary" confession more feeble
than the alternatives to suppressing illegally obtained physical
evidence?
In the three decades that the "involuntariness" doctrine
reigned supreme, various state laws made it a crime to deny
a lawyer the opportunity to meet with an arrestee or to fail to
notify a suspect's relatives that he had been arrested.43
Other state laws penalized police officers who sought to elicit
confessions by violence, threats of violence or other objection-
able means.44 And, of course, false imprisonment and assault
are torts. Why didn't these "alternative remedies" suffice?
Those who balk at imposing the search and seizure
exclusionary rule on the states remind us that it "is a remedy
which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person
or premises something incriminating has been found."45 But
the same may be said for the prohibition against the use of
"involuntary" but reliable confessions. This rule, too, directly
serves only to protect the victim of police lawlessness who
actually confesses and (because I am only discussing "involun-
tary" confessions that are reliable) only the person whose
validity in order to guarantee a conviction. See B. Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions:
The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 354
(1954).
Although the "rule of automatic reversal" has long applied to "involuntary"
confession cases, the Rehnquist Court may, of course, abolish it. But at this point I
am only discussing the "old world" of criminal procedure, the pre-Warren Court
world, and a "rule of automatic reversal" in coerced-confession cases was a feature of
that world.
42. See Dripps, supra note 4, at 631.
43. For a sampling of such state statutes, see Justice Frankfurter's plurality
opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 586 n.29 (1961).
44. See id. at 586 n.28.
45. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (emphasis added).
548 [VOL. 23:4
HeinOnline  -- 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 548 1989-1990
Remembering the "Old World"
confession "checks out." (Most victims of impermissible
interrogation practices never do confess, or never make a
confession that leads to a prosecution).46
Suppose five suspects are "brought in for questioning."
Suppose further that after each one is held incommunicado
overnight and subjected to a long stretch of intensive question-
ing, two confess, but only one confession "checks out." Why
not admit the verifiable confession and remand the defen-
dant-together with those who were mistreated but never
confessed and the one who confessed but was released when
his confession did not check out-"to the remedies of private
action and such protection as the internal discipline of the
police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may af-
ford"?
47
Of course, the Court rejected, or never seriously considered,
these "alternative approaches" to the "involuntary" confession
problem. But why? So far as I am aware, the Court never
really spelled out why. But if pressed to do so, I am confident
that the Court would have offered one or more of the following
reasons:
(a) "The natural way" to respond to a constitutional violation
is to "nullify" it;
(b) We are unwilling to give even tacit approval to official
defiance of constitutional rights by permitting the use of
evidence obtained in violation of those rights;
(c) We are unwilling to let the government profit from its
own wrongdoing;
(d) The Court's aid should be denied in order to maintain
respect for the Constitution and to preserve the judicial
process from contamination by "partnership" in police lawless-
ness;
(e) To declare that in the administration of criminal justice
the end justifies the means-to say that government officials
may act lawlessly in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-is a pernicious doctrine; and,
46. According to the most careful study ever made of such arrests, about 17 out
of every 18 persons "arrested for investigation" and interrogated were ultimately
released without charge-despite the fact that the police had "probable cause" to
arrest in approximately half the cases. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSIONERS'
COMM. ON POLICE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 34
(1962) ("The Horsky Report"). Generally, the longer a person was held the less likely
he was to be charged. See id. at 39.
47. Cf. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31.
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(f) The alternative remedies suggested are likely to be so
infrequently or sporadically enforced that they must be
deemed inadequate, if not largely illusory.
But these arguments for barring the use of "involuntary" but
trustworthy confessions are the very arguments proponents of
the search and seizure exclusionary rule have made for
decades-and are the very reasons that led the Court to adopt
such a rule in 1914 and to reaffirm the rule many times
thereafter.48
Although Professor Grano is most reluctant to "sacrifice
truth" in the administration of criminal justice, at one point he
does suggest certain exceptions to his basic position: "a
serious concern about convicting the innocent, condoning or
encouraging official misconduct, countenancing violations of
the defendant's dignity, or encouraging some other evil of
comparable gravity."49 I fail to see why the search and
seizure exclusionary rule does not fall within one of the
italicized exceptions.
In 1955, Roger Traynor wrote the opinion of the California
Supreme Court that overturned longstanding precedent ° and
adopted the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. He
subsequently explained why:
My misgivings about [the admissibility of illegally seized
evidence] grew as I observed that time after time [such
evidence] was being offered and admitted as a routine
procedure. It became impossible to ignore the corollary
that illegal searches and seizures were also a routine
procedure subject to no effective deterrent; else how could
48. For a discussion of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which
promulgated the fourth amendment or federal exclusionary rule, and the federal
search and seizure cases decided in the next 35 years-until the year of the Wolf
case-see Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 591-93,
598-606 (1983); see also supra note 14.
Unfortunately, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule no longer rests on what
might be called a "principled basis" (e.g., avoiding the "condonation" or "ratification"
of the unconstitutional police conduct that produced the challenged evidence), but on
an empirical proposition. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74.
49. Grano, Introduction, at 404 (emphasis added).
50. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955). Cahan
overruled People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 P. 435 (1922); People v. Le Doux, 155
Cal. 535, 102 P. 517 (1909); and later cases based upon them, which admitted
illegally seized evidence. Thirteen years prior to Cahan, Justice Traynor wrote the
opinion in People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942), a case which
upheld the admissibility of illegally seized evidence and relied on Mayen and Le
Doux.
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illegally obtained evidence come into court with such
regularity? It was one thing to condone an occasional
constable's blunder, to accept his illegally obtained evi-
dence so that the guilty would not go free. It was quite
another to condone a steady course of illegal police
procedures that deliberately and flagrantly violated the
Constitution of the United States as well as the state
constitution.
It was the cumulative effect of such routine that led us
at last . . . to reject illegally obtained evidence. It had
become all too obvious that unconstitutional police meth-
ods of obtaining evidence were not being deterred in any
other way.51
How COGENT IS PROFESSOR GRANO'S
CRITICISM OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
According to Grano, the Mapp case, inter alia, "helped to
precipitate the now dominant public perception ... that the
criminal justice system releases defendants on 'technicalities,'
. . . and converted search and seizure law into an arcane
subject that consumes half of the standard criminal procedure
course in many law schools."52 I question both claims.
I do not deny that there is, and there has long been, a
"public perception" that many guilty criminals are being
released on "mere technicalities." But how did this come
about? For decades police officials and prosecutors have been
telling the public this.53 So have many politicians (who
assume, probably correctly, that their chances of getting
reelected are enhanced if they attack the courts for being
"soft" on crime). So have many members of the press (who too
often cannot resist oversimplifying or sensationalizing the
crime problem).
To be sure, these critics of the exclusionary rule have had a
51. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321-
22.
52. Grano, Introduction, at 395 n.3.
53. See generally Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics
of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964).
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receptive audience. Here, as elsewhere, the more complicated
life becomes, the more people are attracted to simple solutions.
Here, as elsewhere, it is tempting" 'to reconcile the delusion
of our omnipotence with the experience of limited power' " by
explaining seeming failure in terms of incompetence, even
betrayal.
After leading the public to believe that many guilty crimi-
nals are going free on "mere technicalities," a goodly number
of these very same critics of the courts turn around, act as if
they had not helped to shape this public perception, and then
cite the public's lack of respect for the exclusionary rule (or
some other rule they have assailed) as one more reason for
abolishing it.
I think it fair to say that the "costs" of the exclusionary rule
are "much lower . . . than is commonly assumed."55 Indeed,
according to probably the most comprehensive study of the
available empirical data, the evidence "consistently indicates
that the general level of the rule's effects on criminal prosecu-
tions is marginal at most."56 (Thoughtful members of the
public must wonder why-if so many criminals are going free
on "technicalities"-the prison population has doubled in the
last ten years; why 1990 saw "'the largest growth in 65 years
of prison population statistics' ";5' and why more than thirty
54. Cf. N. GRAEBNER, THE NEW ISOLATIONISM 29 (1956) (quoting Hans J.
Morgenthau).
55. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.2 (a), at 22 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].
56. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of"Lost"Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 622; see also Dripps, supra note 4, at 625 (according
to 'national samples of contemporary data ... successful suppression motions have
become quite rare, indeed exotic") and Professor Dripps' review of empirical studies,
id. at n.142.
One may retort, as Justice White did for the Court in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 908 n.6 (1984), that although many researchers have concluded that 'the
impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial ... the small percentages ... mask
a large absolute number of felons who are released because the cases against them
were based in part on illegal searches or seizures." But 'raw numbers are not as
useful for policy evaluation as percentages. In a system as large as the American
criminal justice system ... almost any nationwide measurement or estimate will look
large if expressed in raw numbers." Davies, supra, at 670.
Moreover, '[flor every prosecution aborted by the constitutional exclusionary
rules, roughly a hundred founder because of numbingly prosaic procedural problems.
The guilty go free primarily because justice takes too long and because the witnesses
do not testify when the trial finally occurs." Dripps, supra note 4, at 634 (footnotes
omitted).
57. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1990, at A6, col. 4 (nat'l. ed.) (quoting Stephen D.
552 [VOL. 23:4
HeinOnline  -- 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 552 1989-1990
SUMMER 1990] Remembering the "Old World"
states are under court order because of overcrowded prisons?)'
In any event, if the law of search and seizure is too techni-
cal, this is an attack on the content of the law, not the remedy
for effectuating it. If the law of search and seizure is too
unrealistic or unprincipled, it ought to be changed, not defied
or disregarded.59
Moreover, I think it fair to say that the police have a great
deal more room to maneuver under the fourth amendment
than they did when the California Supreme Court decided
Cahan in 1955 or when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mapp
in 1961. Thirty years ago the police may have been unduly
restricted (at least theoretically) by unrealistic and out-of-date
substantive search and seizure rules, but it is hard to see how
anyone can so describe the law of search and seizure today.
Dillingham, Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics). Donald P. Lay, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has noted that "[firom 1983
to 1988, there was a 51 percent increase in total jail population." Lay, Our Justice
System, So-Called, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, at A19, col. 2.
58. See Applebome, Texas Prisons Stop Accepting Inmates Under Federal Order,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at § 1, p. 8, col. 1 (noting that 32 states and 3 territories
are under such orders); Lay, supra note 57, ("26 percent of jails were under Federal
or state court order or consent decree to limit the number of inmates."); Malcolm,
States'Prisons Continue to Bulge, Overwhelming Efforts at Reform, N.Y. Times, May
20, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 3 (stating that 37 states are under court order).
59. A good example is the fate of the Gouled rule (first articulated in Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921)), a doctrine that placed items of
'evidentiary value only" beyond the reach of the police even when they acted on the
basis of "probable cause" or pursuant to an otherwise valid warrant. As did a number
of commentators, I denounced the Gouled rule because "it departs from the
fundamental principles pervading search and seizure law." Kamisar, Public Safety
v. Individual Liberties: Some 'Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 171, 177 (1962). Shortly after Mapp imposed the exclusionary rule on
the states, Professor Fred Inbau addressed a large group of prosecuting attorneys.
In the course of criticizing Mapp, he warned prosecutors "who come from the states
that have been admitting illegally seized evidence" that they would "experience some
real jolts" if such federal doctrines as the Gouled rule "are applied to your own cases."
Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 85, 87 (1962) (keynote address at the 1961 annual
meeting of the National District Attorneys' Association).
If the fourth amendment, as construed by the courts, did prohibit the seizure of
items of "evidentiary value only," thus carving out a "zone" that the police could
never enter, abolition of the exclusionary rule would not have given the police lawful
authority to enter the zone. The proper response, if criticism of the Gouled rule was
valid (and it was), was not to overrule Mapp or Weeks, but to abolish the Gouled
rule-which the Court subsequently did. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(Brennan, J.) (distinction between "mere evidence" and instrumentalities of crime or
contraband finds no support in the fourth amendment); see also Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 44 & n.2 (1967).
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The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have made their presence
felt.
60
60. There are many cases. A good sampling is the following: Illinois v.
Rodriquez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990) (police may search a dwelling on the "apparent
authority" of a third party who lacks actual authority to consent); Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (in order to help deter and detect drunk
driving, police may stop all motorists at sobriety checkpoints absent any individual-
ized suspicion); Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990) (illustrating how little is
needed to constitute "reasonable suspicion" to stop suspect's car and to question her);
Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990) (police may conduct "protective sweep" of
entire house in which a valid arrest is made if they have "reasonable suspicion" that
the area to be swept harbors a dangerous criminal); California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988) (police examination, for evidence of crime, of contents of opaque sealed
plastic trash bags left for collection was not a fourth amendment "search"); New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (police inspection of automobile junkyard for stolen
property without warrant or individualized suspicion, but pursuant to a statute
covering vehicle dismantlers, was permissible); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986) (police aerial surveillance of a fenced-in backyard not a fourth amendment
"search"); Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (police could search through
shoulder bag at stationhouse inventory of arrestee's effects, even though inventory
objectives could be achieved "in a less intrusive manner"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232, 238, 244 n.13 (1983) (abandoning the existing probable cause structure in
favor of a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test; Court stresses that probable cause is
a "fluid concept. . . not readily, or even usefully reduced to a neat set of legal rules"
and that it "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity");
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (certain police-citizen "contacts" or "encounters,"
such as asking a person at an airport to show her driver's license and airline ticket,
are not fourth amendment "seizures"); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if
police have probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband, they may
conduct warrantless searches of closed containers found in the locked car trunk); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (even though police lack any reason to believe
that a car contains evidence of crime, if they have adequate grounds to make a
custodial arrest of the car's occupants, they may conduct a search of the entire
interior of the car, including closed containers found within that zone, even after the
occupants have been removed from the car and handcuffed); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (police may conduct a thorough search, not merely a
frisk, of a person incident to a valid custodial arrest for a traffic offense even though
such a search is justified neither by the need to prevent destruction of evidence nor
the fear that the motorist is dangerous); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (suspect may effectively consent to an otherwise unlawful search even though
he was never informed, and there is no showing that he was aware, of his right to
refuse the officer's request).
See generally Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court,
22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 825 (1989); Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith,"
and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551 (1984); Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving
Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172 (1983);
LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View,
Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983);
Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective:
Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669 (1988); Mertens, The
Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 551
(1984); Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257 (1984).
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Many years ago, Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo
uttered his oft-quoted criticism of the exclusionary rule: "The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."6'
But in recent years the Court has so narrowed the scope of the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, so
reduced the need to act pursuant to a search warrant, so
softened the standard of "probable cause," and so increased the
occasions on which the police may act on the basis of "reason-
able suspicion" or in the absence of any individualized
suspicion at all62 that the time has come to revise Cardozo's
famous epigram. Nowadays it is more accurate to say that if
the criminal goes free it is because the constable has flouted
the fourth amendment, not because he has made an honest
blunder.
As for Professor Grano's assertion that the adoption of the
exclusionary rule "converted search and seizure into an arcane
subject," I believe he has it backwards. I think it more
accurate to say that in those states that used to admit illegally
seized evidence the law of search and seizure was more arcane
before the exclusionary rule than afterwards. And this body
of law would have remained arcane if the exclusionary rule
had not made its presence felt.
As Professor Edward Barrett, who was more sympathetic to
the needs of law enforcement than most law professors,
observed thirty-five years ago:
[Prior to the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Califor-
nia,] the police were under no substantial pressure to seek
clarification of [the rules governing arrest, search, and
seizure]. The issue of legality became crucial so seldom
that the police had, in effect, broad discretion in determin-
ing the procedures to follow, subject only to community
pressures, particularly those by the press, which rarely
focused upon any but the most obvious abuses.
... [T]he California situation was most unsatisfactory
*... [and t]he possibilities of the situation improving
appeared slight. Law enforcement groups preferred the
ambiguity of [ill-defined and] seldom-litigated rules and
had no real incentive to take the risks involved in seeking
61. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
62. See supra note 60.
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legislative action. And there was little evidence that other
groups would take the initiative.63
When the police need to search a home, what facts constitute
"exigent circumstances" enabling them to bypass the warrant
procedure? When they arrest a motorist, can they search the
entire passenger compartment incident to the arrest? Can
they search the car trunk as well? When, without bothering
to obtain a warrant, may the police open closed containers-or
force open a locked suitcase-found in the trunk of a car?
These questions, and a host of others, were ones the police
should have been asking themselves before their states
adopted an exclusionary rule or had such a rule imposed on
them by the U.S. Supreme Court. There was a body of law
governing these situations-a body of law more abstruse and
obscure than it is today.' And the police were supposed to
be thinking about, and complying with, that body of law in
preexclusionary rule days. But there is considerable evidence
that they were not-that they did not know or care what that
law was. As one high-ranking New York police officer
explained:
Before [Mafip required New York courts to exclude illegally
seized evidence] nobody bothered to take out search
warrants. Although the Constitution requires warrants in
63. See Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment
on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 577, 587 (1955). Although Barrett was,
on balance, opposed to the exclusionary rule, he nevertheless articulated some
justifications for the exclusionary rule as effectively as any of the rule's proponents;
see also Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 260 (1961), reprinted in POLICE POWER AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 92 (C. Sowle ed. 1962), writing on the eve of Mapp:
The law of arrest and illegal searches is undeveloped in states without the
[exclusionary] rule. Many legal questions about proper police conduct cannot be
answered in New York because the New York courts admit illegally obtained
evidence and hence have little chance to pass on questions of police behavior.
The questions have not been resolved by legislation. As a by-product of
California's recent acceptance of the rule, great clarification and modification of
the law of arrest and search and seizure has taken place. The task is not done
unless there is an easy opportunity for litigation.
64. In recent years the Court has been impressed with the need to provide the
police with straightforward or "bright line" rules that usually resolve doubts in their
favor. See, e.g., the Belton, Robinson and Ross cases, all discussed briefly supra note
60. The reaction to this development has been mixed. Compare Alschuler, Bright
Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PiTr. L. REV. 227 (1984) with LaFave,
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith,- 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307 (1982).
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most cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that evidence
obtained without a warrant-illegally if you will-was
admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why
bother?65
If, in the weeks and months following Mapp, many law
enforcement officers discovered for the first time that the law
of search and seizure was complex and difficult, it was only
because it had been that way all along. The exclusionary rule
did not make the law complicated and difficult-it did not, to
use Grano's language, "convert search and seizure law into an
arcane subject." The rule only made a difficult and complex
body of law relevant.
Professor Grano maintains that the law of search and
seizure is filled with "hair-splitting intricacies" that "more
often than not have little to do with the fourth amendment's
essential role in a free society" and that these intricacies "are
the direct result of the exclusionary rule ... ."" Once again,
I submit, he is confusing the content of the law of search and
seizure with the remedy if that body of law is violated.
If the law of search and seizure is unrelated to the fourth
amendment's essential role, the fault lies with the courts that
have misinterpreted the fourth amendment, not with the
exclusionary rule. If the law of search and seizure is too
intricate or rigid, abolishing the exclusionary rule would not
lift the restrictions or eliminate the intricacies. Only a change
in the substantive law of search and seizure can do that.
It may be, as Grano believes, that sometimes the police are
not permitted to make an arrest or conduct a search when
65. Zion, Detectives Get a Course in Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1965, at 50, col. 1
(nat'l ed.). When Leonard Reisman, then the New York City Deputy Police Commis-
sioner in charge of legal matters, made these remarks at a post-Mapp training
session on the law of search and seizure, he was unaware that a New York Times
reporter was in the audience.
Evidently the police were not the only New York law enforcement officials
unfamiliar with and uninterested in the law of search and seizure prior to Mapp.
Professor Richard Uviller, a state prosecuting attorney at the time Mapp was
decided, recalls:
I cranked out a crude summary of federal search and seizure and suppression
law just before the State District Attorney[s'] Association convened .... I had
an instant runaway best seller. It was as though we had made a belated
discovery that the fourth amendment applied in the State of New York....
Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Constitutional
Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502 (1982).
66. Grano, Introduction, at 412.
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they ought to have the authority to do so. If that is the case,
however, abolishing the exclusionary rule would not give the
police the lawful authority to act. It would only remove
whatever incentive they have not to act when, under the
prevailing law, they should not.
As Professor Monrad Paulsen observed on the eve of Mapp:
The exclusionary evidence rule says nothing about the
content of the law governing the police .... To defend the
rule is not to defend any particular formulation regulating
the activities of law enforcement . . . . The rule merely
states the consequences of a breach of whatever principles
might be adopted to control law enforcement officers.
Police officers are not controlled more rigorously by the
exclusionary evidence rule than they are by force of their
own respect for the law.6"
Evidently Professor Grano is unhappy about having to spend
more than twenty hours of his criminal procedure course on
the complexities of search and seizure law.6" I am quite
sympathetic. I teach the same course and use the same
casebook. 9 (But what else should a professor expect when he
adopts a casebook co-authored by someone who has written a
four-volume treatise on the subject?) °
67. Paulsen, supra note 63, at 87; see also Mondale, The Problem of Search and
Seizure, 19 BENCH & B. MINN. 15, 16, 17 (Feb. 1962). As Walter Mondale, then a
young state attorney general five years out of law school, told a group of Minnesota
police officers distressed and befuddled by the Mapp decision:
[T]he Mapp case did not alter or change one word of either the state or national
constitutions . . . [It] does not reduce police powers one iota. It only reduces
potential abuses of power. The adoption of the so-called "exclusionary rules"
does not affect authorized police practices in any way. What was a legal arrest
before, still is. What was a reasonable search before still is.
... The very fact that these [post-Mapp search and seizure] institutes are
being held is eloquent testimony.., of the basic wisdom of the Court's decision.
We are doing today, because of the Court's ruling, what we should have done all
along. We are studying ways in which we can bring our police methods and
procedures into harmony with the constitutional rights of the people we serve.
68. See Grano, Introduction, at 412.
69. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26.
70. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 55. Professor LaFave has
a greater stake in the exclusionary rule than any of us. If the exclusionary rule is
abolished, what does he do for a living? If the exclusionary rule goes, so does his
four-volume treatise-and the substantial royalties that go with it. But I can testify
that LaFave was a strong proponent of the exclusionary rule long before he had a
proprietary interest in it.
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I am tempted to ask Grano how much time he would spend
teaching the law of search and seizure if there were no
exclusionary rule. But the more relevant question is: How
many hours of police training and instruction would be
devoted to this vast subject if there were no exclusionary rule?
How much time did the police devote to the subject in those
jurisdictions that, prior-to Mapp, had no exclusionary rule? If
former New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy
is a credible witness, in one state at least, and a very large
one at that, one may infer that they spent no time at all:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law
enforcement which had such a dramatic and traumatic
effect as [Mapp] .... As the then commissioner of the
largest police force in this country I was immediately
caught up in the entire problem of reevaluating our
procedures, which had followed the Defore rule [a 1926
decision of the highest court of New York permitting law
enforcement officials to use illegally seized evidence in
criminal prosecutions], and modifying, amending, and
creating new policies and new instructions for the imple-
mentation of Mapp .... [Decisions such as Mapp] create
tidal waves and earthquakes which require rebuilding of
our institutions sometimes from their very foundations
upward. Retraining sessions had to be held from the very
top administrators down to each of the thousands of foot
patrolmen and detectives engaged in the daily basic
enforcement function. Hundreds of thousands of man-
hours had to be devoted to retraining 27,000 men.
Why did Mapp have "such a dramatic and traumatic effect"
on law enforcement? Why did it necessitate "retraining
sessions"? What were the old training sessions like? Were
there any search and seizure training sessions prior to Mapp?
What does it mean to say that the police department had to
"implement" Mapp? How does one "implement" a decision that
simply imposes a remedy for a violation of a body of law the
police were supposed to be obeying all along? Doesn't the
commissioner mean that because of Mapp he had to establish
policies and instructions for the implementation of the fourth
71. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem
of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEX. L. REV. 939, 941 (1966).
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amendment?
What did the commissioner mean when he observed that
before Mapp his department "followed the Defore rule"? Defore
permitted the prosecution to use illegally seized evidence, but
it did not authorize the police to conduct illegal searches. It
did not tell the police that they should not or need not
familiarize themselves with the law of search and seizure.
The Defore rule was based largely on the premise that New
York did not need to adopt the exclusionary rule because
existing alternative remedies (such as tort actions and internal
police discipline) were adequate to effectuate the guaranty
against illegal searches and seizures.72  Doesn't the
commissioner's reaction to Mapp constitute dramatic evidence
that these alternative remedies were woefully inadequate?
Why else did Mapp "create tidal waves and earthquakes"?
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES
Professor Grano tells us that he often asks his students
"whether they would continue to support the exclusionary rule
from a policy standpoint if they were convinced that a fully
effective alternative safeguard for fourth amendment rights
was available"-and he is distressed to learn that many of
them still would.73 I am not sure what Grano means by
"available." Theoretically available? Presently avail-
able-actually in operation? If he means the latter, then I
have to say that a majority of the present Court would
probably give Grano the answer he wants.
I believe that originally and for much of its life the federal
exclusionary rule rested not on an empirical proposition, but
on what might be called a "principled basis" (to avoid "ratify-
ing" the unconstitutional police conduct that produced the
proffered evidence, to keep the judicial process from being
contaminated by partnership in police misconduct, and to
assure the police and the public alike that the Court took the
fourth amendment seriously)."v Unfortunately, this is not, or
72. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 19-21, 150 N.E. 585, 586-87 (1926).
73. See Grano, Introduction, at 403 n.31.
74. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 931-44 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
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no longer, the prevailing view. The "deterrence" rationale
(and its concomitant "interest balancing") has gained the
ascendancy.
According to the present Court, the exclusionary rule is not
"a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment";75 it is only
" 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.' "76 Under this view, whether the exclusionary
rule should be applied in a particular case "presents a ques-
tion, not of rights, but of remedies"-a question to be an-
swered by weighing the "potential injury" of the rule against
its "potential benefits."77 To put it unkindly, as dissenting
Justice Brennan did, "[b]y remaining within its redoubt of
empiricism and by basing the [exclusionary] rule solely on the
deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of legiti-
macy."
78
What are some of the implications of the present Court's way
of thinking about the exclusionary rule? Shortly after he
stepped down from the Supreme Court, Justice Potter Stewart
observed:
[T]he Constitution requires only that there be some effec-
tive remedy to ensure that agents of the government obey
the fourth amendment. Thus exclusion is constitutionally
required only if without it there would be no adequate
means to ensure that the government obeys the fourth
amendment.79
dissenting); see also Kamisar, supra note 48, at 598-640; Schrock & Welsh, Up from
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV.
251 (1974).
No doubt the 1914 Weeks Court expected, or at least hoped, to affect police
behavior, but there is no suggestion in any of the early federal exclusionary rule cases
that the rule's survival was to depend on proof that it significantly influences police
behavior.
75. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (White, J.) (adopting a so-
called "good faith" exception, actually a "reasonable mistake" exception, to the
exclusionary rule).
76. Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974) (grand
jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based
on the fruits of an unlawful search)).
77. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348-49, 354.
78. Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1385 (1983).
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As I have already indicated, I do not believe this was what
might be called the "original understanding" of the
exclusionary rule or that it is the proper way to think about
the exclusionary rule. But I do not have any votes. Of those
who do, I have little doubt that five or more agree with Justice
Stewart.
Thus, if a majority of the present Court were convinced that
a fully effective safeguard for fourth amendment rights were
in place and operating (if, for example Congress enacted a
statute "replacing" the exclusionary rule with a streamlined
tort remedy establishing a fairly substantial minimum level of
damages), I doubt that the exclusionary rule would survive.
A majority of the present Court would likely conclude that,
both from a constitutional and a policy standpoint, the
"extreme sanction of exclusion, " " as the Leon Court called
the exclusionary rule, is no longer necessary or appropri-
ate-that it can no longer "pay its way.""1
But if I were one of Professor Grano's students, I would ask
him some questions in return. The first would be: If you were
convinced that no effective alternative to the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule presently exists, would you continue to
oppose it?
The effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of alternatives to the
exclusionary rule in the real world, the only one we have, has
been the subject of a vast literature. The overwhelming
consensus is that civil suits, criminal prosecution, injunctions,
review boards, and internal police discipline are sadly inade-
quate.
8 2
As Professor Dripps points out, in a number of respects the
Office of Legal Policy Report on the Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule8 3 supports the general consensus:
80. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
81. Id. at 907 n.6.
82. The classic article on the general subject is Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955). For the more recent
literature, see Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 378-79, 429-30; Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q.
621; D. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284-
86 (1988); Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and
Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 907.13 (1982); Schroeder,
Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69
GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981); Wasserstrom, supra note 60, at 292-94; Project, Suing the
Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979).
83. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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Since 1971, plaintiffs have filed an estimated 12,000
Bivens actions [suits for damages against federal officers].
In only five cases have the defendants actually paid
damages, and it is not known whether any of these
involved illegal search and seizure. With respect to suits
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [against state and local law
enforcement officers or the governmental unit that employs
them], the Department's research discovered "fewer than
three dozen reported fourth amendment cases over the
past 20 years." The Report identifies two obvious reasons
for the failure of civil plaintiffs to enforce the fourth
amendment: first, juries sympathize with the police and
not with criminals; second, search and seizure activity,
however unconstitutional, ordinarily does not cause the
kind of actual damages that our tort system compensates.
With respect to internal discipline, the Justice Depart-
ment documents only seven investigations into fourth
amendment violations by its agents since 1981; none
resulted in the imposition of sanctions. The Department
did obtain two criminal convictions for violations of fourth
amendment rights, but the defendants were subsequently
pardoned by the President.'
Justice Stewart did say that the fourth amendment "requires
only that there be some effective remedy" for its violation, but
he went on to say that the various alternatives to the
exclusionary rule presently available are so inadequate that
"the exclusionary rule is necessary to keep the right of privacy
secured by the fourth amendment from 'remain[ing] an empty
promise.' "85 As for the currently available alternatives to
the exclusionary rule:
They punish and perhaps deter the grossest of violations,
as well as governmental policies that legitimate these
violations. They compensate some of the victims of the
SERIES, REPORT NO. 2, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989).
84. Dripps, supra note 4, at 629 (footnotes omitted).
85. Stewart, supra note 79, at 1389 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660
(1961)).
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most egregious violations. But they do little, if anything,
to reduce the likelihood of the vast majority of fourth
amendment violations-the frequent infringements
motivated by commendable zeal, not condemnable malice.
For those violations, a remedy is required that inspires the
police officer to channel his enthusiasm to apprehend a
criminal toward the need to comply with the dictates of the
fourth amendment. There is only one such remedy-the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 6
Professor Grano finds it "difficult to believe that we are so
intellectually impoverished ... that we lack the capability of
devising an effective, alternative approach [to the exclusionary
rule]."87 But the problem is not a lack of imagination or
intellectual capacity. Rather, it is a lack of political will.
There is no shortage of theoretically possible ways, aside
from the exclusion of evidence, to make the fourth amendment
viable. Commentators have been underscoring the inadequa-
cies of existing tort remedies or criminal sanctions against
transgressing police and calling for studies of the problem or
proposing meaningful alternatives to the exclusionary rule for
a long time-some before Grano was born.8 But what has
86. Id. at 1388-89.
87. Grano, Introduction, at 413.
88. A notable example is Professor Jerome Hall's famous 1936 article, The Law
of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (1936).
Hall plumped for an effective statutory remedy against the governmental unit that
employed the misbehaving officer. Twenty years later, Professors Edward Barrett
and Caleb Foote made similar proposals. See Barrett, supra note 63, at 592-95;
Foote, supra note 82, at 493.
Away back in 1922, Dean Wigmore, perhaps the leading critic of the exclusionary
rule, offered alternatives: "both a civil action by the citizen thus disturbed and a
process of criminal contempt against the offending officials"-"contempt of the
Constitution," he called it. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 481, 484 (1922). In 1939, William Plumb also accompanied
his attack on the exclusionary rule with suggested alternatives. He emphasized the
need to "devise more effective means of enforcing civil judgments against the
[lawless] officers, by garnishment or otherwise" and the need to "translate" the
'paper" criminal penalties against misbehaving police "into effective actuality,"
suggesting "some summary proceeding in the nature of contempt, in which the court
would take the initiative . . .without the intervention of the prosecutor." Plumb,
Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 386-88 (1939). In 1957, still
another critic of the exclusionary rule, Virgil Peterson, offered still another
alternative-that in each jurisdiction a civil rights office be established, independent
of the regular prosecutor, "charged solely with the responsibility of investigating and
prosecuting alleged violations of the Constitution by law enforcement officials."
Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 46, 62
(1957).
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come of these studies and proposals?
Forty-seven years elapsed between the time the federal
courts adopted the exclusionary rule (Weeks) and the time the
rule was imposed on the states (Mapp). In all that time, so far
as I have been able to discover, none of the many states whose
courts permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence devel-
oped an effective alternative safeguard. 9
Is there any reason to think that today's or tomorrow's
politicians are, or will be, any less fearful of crime and any
more concerned about protecting people under investigation by
the police than the politicians of any other generation? Is
there any reason to think that the lawmakers of our day are
any more willing than their predecessors to invigorate tort and
criminal remedies against law enforcement officials who
commit excesses in their overzealous efforts to contend with
"criminals" and "suspected criminals"?90
There is ample cause to believe that the Mapp Court's view
that alternatives to the exclusionary rule "have been worthless
and futile" is still valid.9' So far, nothing else has worked.
That is "good reason for maintaining a healthy skepticism
about any proposal to abandon the exclusionary rule in favor
of some other supposed remedy."92
If I were a student of Professor Grano's, I would ask him
another question: If you were convinced that large numbers
of police view the exclusionary rule as if it were the fourth
amendment and that they would regard "repealing the rule"
89. In 1949, the time Wolf was decided, 31 states admitted illegally seized
evidence. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 38 (1949). A decade later, 24 states still
did. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
One reason the California Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in 1955
was the failure of any effective alternative safeguard to emerge and the unlikelihood
that it ever would. Consider Traynor, supra note 51, at 324:
In California six years elapsed between Wolf v. Colorado and [California's
adoption of the exclusionary rule], and all during that time we were painfully
aware of the right begging in our midst. We remained mindful of the cogent
reasons for the admission of illegally obtained evidence and clung to the fragile
hope that the very brazenness of lawless police methods would bring on effective
deterrents other than the exclusionary rule.... [But] it became all too clear in
our state that there was no recourse but to the exclusionary rule .... [A] like
reflection of nation-wide import must also have been developing in the Supreme
Court of the United States.
90. Cf. Suro, An Old Refrain, Crime, Sounded in New Contests, N.Y. Times, Oct.
16, 1990, at A22, col. 1 (late ed. final) ("Talking tough [about crime] is as popular as
ever, but it is not enough this year because virtually all politicians are doing it.").
91. See sources cited supra note 82; see also Dripps, supra note 4, at 628-30.
92. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 55, at § 1.2(c).
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as an indication that the fourth amendment is no longer a
serious matter, would you still oppose the rule?
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the police have great
difficulty disentangling the exclusionary rule from the fourth
amendment itself. Thus, shortly after Mapp was decided, a St.
Paul officer argued that his prior unconstitutional conduct had
not been improper because the courts of his state had accepted
evidence-had "okayed" what he and his colleagues had
done.93 And at least two of the nation's leading police chiefs,
William Parker of Los Angeles and Michael Murphy of New
York, viewed the exclusionary rule (which has nothing to say
about the content of the law governing the police) as a rule
that imposed new substantive restrictions on searches and sei-
zures 94-"dramatic testimony to the hollowness of the Fourth
Amendment in the absence of the rule."95
More recently, the implications of this anecdotal evidence
were confirmed by an intensive study of New York police
perceptions and attitudes about the exclusionary rule.96
According to this study (the only one of its kind, so far as I
know), there is-
strong evidence that, regardless of the effectiveness of
direct sanctions, police officers could neither understand
nor respect a Court which purported to impose constitu-
tional standards on the police without excluding evidence
obtained in violation of those standards.
.. [M]ost police officers interpret the Wolf case as not
having imposed any legal obligation on the police since,
under that decision, the evidence would still be admissible
no matter how it was obtained.
No matter what sanctions may be imposed in its stead,
93. See Kamisar, supra note 53, at 442-43.
94. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 954 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Davies, supra note 56, at 629-30; Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or
"Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 72-73
(1978).
95. Davies, supra note 56, at 630 n.112.
96. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49
UMKC L. REV. 24 (1980). The author of the study, who teaches police officer
students at John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York,
conducted many interviews with police commanders on all levels, as well as with the
police officer students. He was also a participant-observer on 40 tours of duty
concerning various phases of police work. Id. at 29.
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police officers are bound to view the elimination of the
exclusionary rule as an indication that the fourth amend-
ment is not a serious matter, if indeed it applies to them
at all.
. . . Since the rule has become functionally identified
with the fourth amendment, the removal of the rule is
likely to be interpreted as an implicit condoning of viola-
tions of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, no matter
what substitute remedies may be applied.
Finally, if I were one of Professor Grano's students, I would
ask him one more question (or two more closely related ques-
tions): If your goal is to uproot rules that "impede the discov-
ery of reliable evidence at the investigative stages of the
criminal justice process,"98 how would you achieve that
objective by replacing the exclusionary rule with "a fully
effective alternative safeguard for fourth amendment rights?"
If the alternative to the exclusionary rule were truly effective,
wouldn't it restrain the police from violating the fourth
amendment in advance?
It is hard to improve on the late John Kaplan's comments on
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule:
From a public relations point of view, it is the worst
possible kind of rule because it only works at the behest of
a person, usually someone who is clearly guilty, who is
attempting to prevent the use against himself of evidence
of his own crimes .... If there were some way to make the
police obey, in advance, the commands of the Fourth
Amendment, we would lose at least as many criminal
convictions as we do today, but in that case we would not
know of the evidence which the police could discover only
97. Id. at 29-30. Although a recent study of Chicago narcotics officers, Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987) (authored by Myron W. Orfield, Jr.), did not
focus primarily on police attitudes toward the exclusionary rule, its findings are
consistent with Professor Loewenthal's study. Many of the officers interviewed, for
example, expressed the view that the exclusionary rule was "necessary as a limit on
police behavior." Id. at 1051.
98. Professor Grano notes, quoting the prefatory statement of Attorney General
Edwin Meese III with apparent approval, that "the Truth in Criminal Justice Series
was prompted by 'grave concern' that '[olver the past thirty years... a variety of new
rules have emerged that impede the discovery of reliable evidence at the investigative
stages of the criminal justice process ... .'" Grano, Introduction, at 402.
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through a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is
possible that the real problem with the exclusionary rule
is that it flaunts before us the price we pay for the Fourth
Amendment.99
I take it that Professor Grano supports a rule that would
make the police obey the commands of the fourth amendment
"in advance." (What else does one mean by a "fully effective
alternative safeguard for fourth amendment rights?") I fail to
see how such an alternative rule would "denigrate[] the
primacy of truth as a goal of the criminal justice system"'00
any less than the exclusionary rule does.
Wouldn't an effective tort remedy impair the government's
"ability to identify [a criminal] as the perpetrator of an offense
and to obtain and use evidence establishing his guilt" just as
much as the exclusionary rule?' More generally, wouldn't
a meaningful tort remedy, or any other effective means of
controlling unconstitutional police activity, "sacrifice truth"
and subordinate the goal of apprehending and punishing
criminals to fourth amendment interests just as much as the
exclusionary rule?
Professor Grano contemplates a "new world," one without
the exclusionary rule.' 2 In that new world, the convictions
of "guilty" defendants would not be overturned because of
fourth amendment violations, but (if the effective alternative
rule were really effective) only because such criminals would
not be illegally arrested or unlawfully searched in the first
place.'0 3 The criminal would not be "set free" because the
privacy of his home or person had been infringed-but he
would remain free all along because (lacking adequate grounds
99. J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16 (2d ed. 1978).
100. In the course of attacking the exclusionary rule, Professor Grano states: [lilt
may not be an exaggeration to say that no other rule of criminal procedure more
effectively denigrates the primacy of truth as a goal of the criminal justice system."
Grano, Introduction, at 412.
101. Cf. Markman, Foreword: The 'Truth in Criminal Justice' Series, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 425, 428 (1989) ("To bring the incapacitative and specific deterrent effects
of the system into play against a criminal, the authorities must have the ability to
identify him as the perpetrator of an offense and to obtain and use evidence
establishing his guilt.").
102. See Grano, Introduction, at 423.
103. See Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency? 98
HARv. L. REV. 592, 609-10 (1985); see also Dripps, supra note 4, at 622, 628.
568 [VOL. 23:4
HeinOnline  -- 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 568 1989-1990
Remembering the "Old World"
to arrest him or to search his home, and restrained by an
effective tort remedy), the police would not infringe his privacy
in the first place.
Come to think of it, there is much to be said for such a
world-but I doubt that many law enforcement officials would
have anything good to say about it. They would probably be
too busy complaining about the costs of that new-fangled "fully
effective alternative safeguard for fourth amendment
rights."" 4 Once again, however, they would really be com-
plaining about the costs of the fourth amendment.
SHOULD THE POLICE BE PERMITTED
(As THEY WERE IN THE "OLD WORLD" OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)
TO CONTINUE TO QUESTION SUSPECTS
IN THE FACE OF THEIR REQUESTS TO CONSULT A LAWYER?
Professor Grano reminds us °5 that some thirty years ago,
in Crooker v. California"°' and the companion case of Cicenia
v. LaGay, °7 the Court upheld the admissibility of the chal-
lenged confessions even though in both cases the police had
denied the suspects' requests to contact a specific attorney.
Crooker arose as follows: After he was taken to the police
station, Crooker stated that he wanted a lawyer before he
would talk with the police. The police told him that he could
contact an attorney "after our investigation was concluded."
Crooker then named a friend who was a lawyer and who
"would probably handle the case for him" and asked whether
he could call that person. Again he was rebuffed. Again he
was told that he would be allowed to call the lawyer only after
the police were "through with the investigation."' ° Al-
though it is not clear from the majority opinion, it seems that
during the eight or nine hours he was held until five o'clock in
104. Cf. Comment, supra note 97, at 1018 (officers "believed an alternative tort
remedy would 'overdeter' the police in their search and seizure activities").
105. See Grano, Introduction, at 397-98.
106. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
107. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
108. These facts are set forth in the state supreme court opinion, 47 Cal. 2d 348,
351-52, 303 P.2d 753, 756 (1956), and in Justice Douglas's dissent, 357 U.S. at 441-
42. The facts are treated more summarily in the opinion of the Court.
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the morning, when he was placed in jail and permitted to
sleep, Crooker made "repeated requests" for a lawyer and that
all such requests were denied.'0 9
For the police to persist in questioning him after preventing
his attempts to contact a specific lawyer, maintained Crooker,
was both unfair and coercive." 0 A 5-4 majority, per Clark,
J., was not impressed. As Professor Grano notes,"1  the
majority retorted that the rule suggested by Crooker would
have "a devastating effect" on law enforcement, "for it would
effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as un-
fair-until the accused was afforded opportunity to call his
attorney. " 112 Had issue been joined? The Court seemed to
think so.
Why, in 1958, did the Court consider the police questioning
to which Crooker was subjected "fair" and "noncoercive?" I
think it came down to this: The Court believed, or simply
assumed, that precluding or postponing police questioning
until a suspect's request for counsel was honored would have
a devastating effect on the administration of criminal justice.
(On the eve of Miranda, however, law enforcement officials
would have been delighted to settle for this.)"' Therefore,
109. Five years later, dissenting in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 525
(1963), the author of the Crooker opinion, Justice Clark, looked back on that case as
one where "petitioner's repeated requests for an attorney were denied .
Moreover, dissenting in Crooker, Justice Douglas describes the case as one where,
after the initial requests for an attorney were denied, "[tIhis demand for an attorney
was made over and over again" prior to the time Crooker confessed. 357 U.S. at 442
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
110. Crooker, 357 U.S. at 437-38.
111. Grano, Introduction, at 397-98.
112. Crooker, 357 U.S. at 441. Mr. Crooker was a college graduate who had
attended the first year of law school, during which time he had studied criminal law.
See id. at 435, 438. Thus, but for Cicenia, decided the same day, Crooker could be
read narrowly as a case where the possibility of coercion produced by police denial
of a specific request to consult with counsel was negated by the suspect's intelligence
and education. See id. at 438. But Mr. Cicenia had not attended law school nor
graduated from college. Nevertheless, without discussing his intelligence or
education, the Cicenia Court quickly disposed of the contention that his confession
was "vitiated by police refusal to permit him to confer with counsel during his
detention" on the ground that that contention "is disposed of by Crooker v. California
... decided today." Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 508 (1958).
113. At least in pre-Miranda days (when the rights of a suspect were much less
known), very few suspects initiated a request for retained counsel-and that was the
narrow right Crooker was urging. Moreover, in those few instances where requests
for an identified lawyer were made, in at least some jurisdictions they were usually
honored as a matter of practice. See W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A
SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 393-94 (F. Remington ed. 1965) (reporting on the practice in
Midwestern cities); Hearings on S. 486 and H.R. 7525 Before the Senate Comm. on
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concluded the Court, it had to allow police questioning to
continue in the face of suspects' requests for counsel and in
order to do so it had to characterize such questioning as "fair"
and "noncoercive."
The Crooker and Cicenia cases, Grano reminds us, "illustrate
the old world" of criminal procedure."' Indeed they do.
Evidently, Grano supports both the reasoning and the result
in those cases. Although he does not say so explicitly, he
strongly implies that, so far as the law of confessions is
concerned, Crooker and Cicenia not only represent a "different
world,"" 5 but a better one."
6
One need not be an admirer of Miranda to condemn Crooker
and Cicenia. I venture to say that even the late Judge Henry
Friendly, perhaps the most formidable critic of Miranda, and
the Warren Court's approach to criminal procedure general-
ly," 7 would have balked at the reasoning and the result in
Crooker and Cicenia.
Although I take a much more expansive view of the right to
counsel, Judge Friendly drew a distinction between (a)
requiring the government to provide counsel for a suspect or
even to advise him that he had a right to a lawyer (which he
did not think was mandated by the sixth amendment) and (b)
requiring the government to take a "neutral" stance and thus
prohibiting its agents from frustrating a suspect's effort to
contact a lawyer (which, he thought, might be enough to
the District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1963) (police chiefs discussion of
long-established practice in Washington, D.C.).
It is not amiss to note that the overwhelming consensus of the empirical studies
available is that even when, as Miranda requires, suspects are advised, or at least
are supposed to be advised, of their right to a lawyer before and during police
questioning and of their right to a lawyer at state expense if they cannot afford to
hire one, many continue to confess without bothering to obtain the assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1352
n.23 (1968) (of 185 persons arrested for homicide, only 31 (17%) made a telephone
request for counsel); see generally authorities discussed infra note 164.
114. Grano, Introduction, at 397.
115. Id. at 398.
116. Thus, Grano informs us that he "pause[s] over" Crooker and Cicenia in class
because these cases "demonstrate that the criminal justice system not so long ago
proceeded from quite different assumptions, that we did have choices along the way,
and that today's way of thinking-the students' automatic way of thinking-was not
predestined to prevail." Id. He also tells us that when his students "are incredulous
to learn" that he favors "removing counsel, both retained and appointed, from the
interrogation room," he refers to Crooker and Cicenia. Id.
117. See H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 235-84 (1967).
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satisfy the sixth amendment).118
The same "neutrality" stance is reflected in the first
draft-the pre-Miranda draft--of the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure:
Although we do not believe that the state has an affir-
mative obligation to insure that persons in custody will not
incriminate themselves, this does not mean that the state
has a right to tip the scales the other way and prevent a
person in custody from seeking aid and assistance at every
step of the investigation if he wishes to have it. And
although the state has no obligation to refrain from
inquiry if a prisoner is lawfully in custody and available
for inquiry, the state has no right at any time to take
positive steps to insure that that inquiry will be carried on
under conditions which deprive a person of legal and moral
support and advice." 9
Not infrequently, as a member of the Advisory Committee to
the Model Pre-Arraignment Code, I criticized the Reporters for
being too insensitive to the rights of suspects. I recall their
views now to demonstrate that even those who take what I
consider to be a rather cramped view of the fifth and sixth
amendments would not support Crooker and Cicenia.
Although I have done so up to this point, one need not
analyze the Crooker rule in terms of the right to counsel. One
may also appraise it in light of the pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda
"voluntariness" test. Whether or not one believes that
custodial police interrogation without more is "inherently
coercive" or, more accurately, that such interrogation gener-
ates enough tension and pressure to constitute "compulsion"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment, 2 ° what about
the circumstances in which Mr. Crooker found himself? Isn't
persistent stationhouse questioning in the face of a suspect's
118. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L.
REV. 929, 942 & n.70, 943 (1965), reprinted in H. FRIENDLY, supra note 117, at 235,
249 & n.70, 251.
119. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 186 (tent. draft no. 1,
1966), (commentary to § 5.07) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
120. Compare Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 31, at 440-53 with
Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 174, 180-86 (1988) and Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial
Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 942-44
(1987).
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clear and repeated expressions of unwillingness to talk to the
police without first consulting a lawyer "inherently coercive"?
Doesn't continued interrogation under such circumstances
significantly undermine the average person's resolve?'21
Send the message that he is cut off from the outside world
unless and until he answers his captor's questions? Impress
upon him that his ultimate freedom and fate are in the hands
of his captors?'22
During its long reign, the terminology of the pre-Miranda
"voluntariness" test remained the same-the courts continued
to use such language as "voluntariness," "coercion," "free will,"
"unconstrained choice," "breaking the will" and "overbearing
the mind"-but the meaning of these elusive terms changed.
As Justice Harlan pointed out in his Miranda dissent, there
was "a continuing re-evaluation on the facts of each case of
how much pressure on the suspect was permissible"1 23 and
"the overall gauge has been steadily changing, usually in the
direction of restricting admissibility." 24
Even before the "voluntariness" test was largely displaced,
first by Escobedo and then by Miranda, I doubt that Crooker
and Cicenia were still "good law." I have in mind Haynes v.
Washington,'12  the last of the pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda
cases to apply the "voluntariness" test, where, during the
sixteen-hour period between the time of his arrest and the
time he signed a written confession, the suspect "several
times" asked the police to allow him to call his wife, only to be
told each time that he would not be permitted to do so unless
and until he "cooperated" with the police and admitted his
involvement in the case. 126  In invalidating the resulting
121. Mr. Crooker was not the "average defendant," but a college graduate who had
attended one year of law school. See supra note 112. As the companion case of
Cicenia v. LaGay indicates, however, even if Mr. Crooker had been an average
defendant, the result would have been the same. See id.
122. Section 5.04(b) of the pre-Miranda MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE draft classifies "persistent questioning" of a suspect after he has "made
it clear that he is unwilling to make a statement or wishes to consult counsel before
making a statement" as one form of "unfair inducement of statements." MODEL
CODE, supra note 119, at 45. A note on § 5.04(b), id., explains that "[p]ersistence in
interrogation in the face of such a clear expression of will would clearly appear to be
coercive."
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
126. Id. at 504.
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confession, a 5-4 majority, per Goldberg, J., observed:
Confronted with the express threat of continued incom-
municado detention and induced by the promise of commu-
nication with and access to family, Haynes understandably
chose to make and sign the damning written statement;
given the unfair and inherently coercive context in which
made, that choice cannot be said to be the voluntary
product of a free and unconstrained will, as required by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
127
As I see it, the Court could have described Crooker's plight
essentially the same way it described Haynes'. Indeed, all
other things being equal, repeated denials of a suspect's
request to call a lawyer strike me as more likely to undermine
a person's resolve-more likely to bring home to him the
intimidating nature of incommunicado detention-than
repeated denials of a suspect's request to contact his spouse.
As the Court has since observed:
[T]he lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system
because of his unique ability to protect ... a client under-
going custodial interrogation....
• . . Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands
accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as
a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that
person in his dealings with the police and the courts.
12
In any event, I do not see how one can reconcile the Court's
approach in Haynes with its reasoning five years earlier in
Crooker and Cicenia.2 s More important, Justice Clark, the
author of the Crooker opinion, did not see how Crooker and
127. Id. at 514.
128. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (Blackmun, J.). I realize that the
Court made these remarks in a case applying and explaining the Miranda doctrine,
but it seems to me that it is a sound observation whatever test a court is using for
admitting confessions. A lawyer has always had a "unique ability" to protect a person
in the hands of the police; she has always been regarded as the prime protector of a
suspect's rights.
129. See Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1004
(1966) (pre-Miranda) ("[Ulnless Haynes v. Washington is 'limited to its facts' or
otherwise explained, the grant of a request for counsel may be required by the
voluntariness test.").
574 [VOL. 23:4
HeinOnline  -- 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 574 1989-1990
Remembering the "Old World"
Haynes could be reconciled either. Dissenting in Haynes, he
protested:
The Court concludes . . . that the police, by holding
petitioner incommunicado and telling him that he could
call his wife after he made a statement and was booked,
wrung from him a confession he would not otherwise have
made, a confession which was not the product of a free
will. In Crooker v. California . . . however, we found no
coercion or inducement, despite the fact that the
petitioner's repeated requests for an attorney were denied
and "he was told that 'after [the] investigation was con-
cluded he could call an attorney.' "'0
Some rules of the "old world" of criminal procedure might
have been better than those we have today. But not the
Crooker-Cicenia rule. I think it unlikely that the Court will
overrule Miranda, at least in the foreseeable future. But even
if it does I believe it highly unlikely that the Court will
revivify Crooker and Cicenia. I doubt that we shall ever pass
that way again. Nor should we.
Is MIRANDA "INCOMPATIBLE"
WITH THE APPROACH TAKEN IN
THE MORE RECENT CONFESSION CASES?
According to Professor Grano, the "philosophical premises"
underlying Miranda and "the recent cases that have been
chipping away at Miranda" are "contradictory" and "incom-
patible." 3' To make his point, Grano compares and con-
trasts language in the recent case of Moran v. Burbine32
with passages in a decision that preceded Miranda by two
years, Escobedo v. Illinois133 (but strangely, not with any
language in Miranda itself).
134
Burbine recognized the need for, and the importance of,
130. 373 U.S. at 525 (Clark, J., dissenting).
131. See Grano, Introduction, at 406-08.
132. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
133. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
134. See Grano, Introduction, at 406-07.
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police questioning as "a tool for effective enforcement of
criminal laws."135 It declined to adopt a rule "requiring the
police to inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact
him"'36 when the suspect had waived his rights (including
the right to counsel) and was unaware that a relative of his
had asked a lawyer to meet with him. The Court concluded
that the "minimal benefit" such a rule would add to the
suspect's protection was outweighed by the "substantial cost"
it would impose on society. 3 v
Escobedo, on the other hand, does contain some sweeping
language indicating an unwillingness to accommodate compet-
ing interests. 13' Thus, the Escobedo Court rejected the
argument that if a right to counsel were provided prior to
indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the police
would be significantly reduced, retorting:
This argument, of course, cuts two ways. The fact that
many confessions are obtained during this period points up
its critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice"
are surely needed .... The right to counsel would indeed
be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were
obtained. 
13
At another point, as Grano notes, 4 ° the Escobedo majority
observed:
We have learned the lesson of history ... that a system of
criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the
"confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrin-
135. 475 U.S. at 426 (quoted in Grano, Introduction, at 407).
136. 475 U.S. at 427 (quoted in Grano, Introduction, at 407).
137. Id.
138. The Escobedo opinion has an accordion-like quality. At some places the
language of the opinion is quite confining, so much so that it arguably limits the case
to its special facts. At other places, however, the opinion does launch a broad attack
on the use of confessions in general and does threaten (or promise) to eliminate
virtually all police interrogation. For a summary of the wide disagreement over the
probable meaning of Escobedo-and over what it ought to mean-see Y. KAMISAR,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 161-62 (1980)
[hereinafter KAMISAR ESSAYS].
139. 378 U.S. at 489 (quoted in part in Grano, Introduction, at 406-07).
140. See Grano, Introduction, at 407.
576 [VOL. 23:4
HeinOnline  -- 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 576 1989-1990
Remembering the "Old World"
sic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.141
Because Grano never quotes from Miranda, only from
Escobedo, how does he establish that the premises of Miranda
and the recent confession cases are "contradictory" and
"incompatible"? He assures us that "Miranda and its progeny
* . .are essentially dependent upon the thinking reflected in
Escobedo" and that the language in Escobedo "reflects the
thinking that underlies Miranda."'42 But he never supports,
or even tries to support, that assertion. I don't think he can.
I think that the Escobedo language he quotes only reflects the
thinking in Escobedo, not that in Miranda.
Although many hoped that the Miranda Court would beat a
general retreat from Escobedo, which the Miranda Court did
not do, it did turn away from the expansive language and far-
reaching implications of Escobedo. Miranda did not build on
the thinking in Escobedo as much as it displaced it. Although
the Miranda Court moved in the same general direction as
Escobedo, it chose a different path. Its "use of 'custodial
interrogation' actually mark[ed] a fresh start in describing the
point at which the Constitutional protections begin."'43
This is not something I am saying for the first time in
response to Professor Grano. Rather, it is something that
seemed fairly clear to me a quarter of a century ago, the year
Miranda was decided:
As I read Miranda, it is not simply a bigger and better (or
worse, depending upon your viewpoint) Escobedo. It is
quite different. Escobedo assigns primary significance to
the amount of evidence of guilt available to the police at
the time of questioning; hence there is much talk about
"prime suspects," "focal point," and the "accusatory" stage.
Miranda, on the other hand, attaches primary significance
to the conditions surrounding or inherent in the interro-
gation setting; hence it includes much talk of "police-
141. 378 U.S. at 488-89 (footnote omitted).
142. Grano, Introduction, at 406, 406-08.
143. Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" within the Meaning of Miranda, in
CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 335, 339 (1968).
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dominated" or "government-established atmosphere" that
"carries its own badge of intimidation," "compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings," "subjugating the
individual to the will of his examiner," "putting the
defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his
capacity for rational judgment," and the like .... [Absent
the requisite inherent pressures] the person subjected to
police questioning is not entitled to the Miranda warn-
ings-no matter how much the police have "focused" on
him or to what extent they regard him as the "prime"
suspect, the only suspect or "the accused"... Miranda has
not enlarged Escobedo as much as it has displaced it.
I think Miranda is a better, tighter, more carefully
thought-out opinion. The Miranda Court had the benefit
of a number of first-class briefs, a number of probing,
illuminating law review articles and notes, and the very
valuable commentaries to the first draft of the American
Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
In the two years between Escobedo and Miranda, there
was a tremendous concentration of thought and energy on
the problem, a very significant clarifying and sharpening
of the issues.144
Many Court observers were greatly troubled, one might even
say alarmed, by the sweeping language and broad implications
of Escobedo. They voiced concern that Escobedo's reliance on
the sixth amendment "apparently makes available to any
suspect a full-blown right to counsel at the incipient accusato-
ry stage when police interrogation shifts from general inquiry
to a probe focusing upon him."4 ' They feared that the Court
144. Kamisar, Miranda's Impact on Police Practices (Panel Evaluation), in A NEW
LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDO-THE SECOND ROUND 79, 92-93 (B. George ed.
1967) (transcript of remarks made at a summer 1966 conference on Escobedo and
Miranda).
Although, as discussed earlier, in contrasting the Warren and Burger Courts'
approach to police interrogation, Professor Grano equates the thinking in Escobedo
with that in Miranda, at another point in his Introduction he observes: "While
Miranda rights, including the Miranda right to counsel, are premised on fifth
amendment considerations, Escobedo . . . relied on the sixth amendment right to
counsel .... In retrospect, the Court perceived that Escobedo, like Miranda, really
should have been decided on fifth amendment grounds." Grano, Introduction, at 408-
09.
145. Traynor, supra note 25, at 669 (pre-Miranda).
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might be in the process of shaping "a novel right not to confess
except knowingly and with the tactical assistance of coun-
sel."'46 Even the admissibility of "volunteered" statements
seemed in doubt.
The recent Burger Court confession cases did not put these
fears to rest. Miranda did. "[T]he Court could have developed
Escobedo into a doctrine . . . mandating that no waiver of
rights would be accepted unless the accused had first consult-
ed with counsel." 47 The Burger Court did not cut off that
development; Miranda did. Escobedo manifested what not a
few would call "extremist 'thinking.'" The Burger Court did
not revise that thinking; Miranda did.
Perhaps because a total denial of access to a suspect as a
source of evidence "was unsalable to a majority of the Court
and, in the end, was probably unbearable to everyone,"'48 the
Miranda Court sought to strike a balance between the
interests of the police and the rights of suspects. It may be
said, and it has been, that Miranda failed to achieve a
sensible or a "principled" balance-that it produced "at best a
tense, temporary, ragged truce" that should satisfy nobody. 149-
But, whatever may be said about Escobedo, I do not think it
can be said of Miranda, as Grano suggests, and as another
leading critic of the case flatly asserts, that "the Court boldly
and improperly resolved the contradictions in the law of
confessions by giving it a single focus-protection of the
suspect"' 5 -that the Court failed to consider"' or to try to
accommodate the needs of the police:
[A]lthough one would gain little inkling of it from the hue
and cry that greeted that much-maligned case... Miranda
marked a "compromise" between the old "voluntariness"
146. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 60-61, 69, 83 (1964).
147. Benner, supra note 40, at 160.
148. Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516,
529 (1976).
149. Id. at 526.
150. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1469 (1985).
151. A 12-page section of the Miranda opinion, 384 U.S. 436, 479-91 (1966),
responds to the argument that "society's need for interrogation outweighs the
privilege," id. at 479. In this section, the Miranda majority maintains that the
experience in some other countries indicates that the danger to law enforcement in
restrictions on interrogation is "overplayed" and observes that, despite the fact that
its practice has been to give suspects some of the warnings now required by Miranda,
the FBI has compiled a record of effective law enforcement.
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test (and the objectionable police interrogation tactics it
permitted in fact) and extreme proposals that-as the fear
(or hope) was expressed at the time-would have "killed"
confessions. On the eve of Miranda there may have been
reason to believe that "the doctrines converging upon the
institution of police interrogation [were] threatening to
push on to their logical conclusion-to the point where no
questioning of suspects [would] be permitted" [quoting
Justice Schaefer], but Miranda fell well short of that point.
Miranda did not, and did not try to, "kill" confessions.
It left the police free to hear and act upon "volunteered"
statements, even though the "volunteer" had been taken
into custody and neither knew nor was informed of his
right to counsel and to remain silent; it allowed the police
to conduct "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning" or "other
general questioning of citizens" [quoting Miranda], even
though the citizen was both uninformed and unaware of
his rights; and, even when the proceedings moved to the
station house, and police interrogators were admittedly
bent on eliciting incriminating statements from the prime
suspect, it allowed them to obtain waivers of the privilege
and the assistance of counsel without the advice or pres-
ence of counsel, without the advice or presence of a judicial
officer, and evidently without any objective recordation of
the proceedings.'52
152. Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Lat-
er-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 30-31 (1974),
reprinted in KAMISAR ESSAYS, supra note 138, at 88-90. The quotation from Justice
Schaefer may be found in W. SCHAEFER, supra note 27, at 9. The quotations from
Miranda appear in 384 U.S. at 477.
See also Benner, supra note 40, at 161 ("Confronted with the storm of controversy
that [Escobedo] created, the Court retreated in Miranda, and struck a compromise";
this compromise permitted the police to obtain waivers of all suspects' rights and
thus "transformed the debate about self-incrimination into a debate about waiver");
Frankel, supra note 148, at 529 (criticizing Miranda for "leaving an opening" which
"predictably meant" that confused, unintelligent or unsophisticated suspects would
confess); Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days
of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 736 (1987) ("In place of a flat prohibition
[against custodial interrogation], the [Miranda] Court compromised"; "[t]his
compromise was intended to limit custodial interrogation to those suspects who were
willing to submit to it"); Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law
or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 23 (1986) ("Miranda is more of a compromise
than most critics would care to admit."); Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra
note 31, at 460 ("The Miranda decision, of course, was a compromise"; "it stopped far
short of barring all pressured or ill-considered waivers of fifth amendment rights.").
But cf. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1264-68
(1988).
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To be sure, a number of Burger and Rehnquist Court confes-
sion cases have "chipped away" at Miranda, as Grano charac-
terizes it,' 5 ' but it is not at all clear, as he maintains, that
Moran v. Burbine is one of them. A footnote in the Miranda
opinion does seem to say that preventing an attorney from
consulting with his client would constitute a violation of the
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel,154 but at
that point the Miranda Court was discussing Escobedo and in
that case the suspect repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer
and was aware of the fact that the police were preventing his
lawyer from talking to him. '55 This realization may well
have underscored the police domination of the situation and
undermined the suspect's resolve.'
5 6
The Miranda Court wrote a sixty-page opinion based on the
premise that police-issued warnings can adequately protect a
suspect's rights. It is hard to believe that that Court would
consider the now-familiar warnings insufficient when-even
though a suspect has been adequately advised of his rights
and has effectively waived them, thus expressing a willingness
to talk to the police without a lawyer-a lawyer whose services
the suspect has not sought has, unbeknown to him, entered the
picture.
It may be forcefully argued that a rule complementing the
Miranda doctrine should bar the admissibility of a confession
obtained in Burbine-like circumstances, but I do not think that
Miranda requires such a result. The Burbine Court's reading
of Miranda is not the only possible interpretation of that
Some readers may wonder why a statement "volunteered" by a person taken into
police custody is admissible even though that person has not been warned of his
rights. The reason is that absent police interrogation, the pressures and anxieties
generated by arrest and detention do not rise to the level of "compulsion" within the
meaning of the privilege. Absent the requisite "compulsion" there is no need to dispel
or to neutralize the pressures of the police environment by giving the Miranda
warnings. Thus, as Justice White pointed out in his Miranda dissent, a suspect "may
blurt out [an admissible] confession . . .despite the fact that he is alone and in
custody, without any showing that he had any notion of his right to remain silent or
of the consequences of his admission." 384 U.S. at 533 (White, J., dissenting).
153. Some commentators have put it more strongly. See Alschuler, Failed
Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442-43
(1987); Benner, supra note 40, at 163; Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99. But cf. Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court:
Trends and Countertrends, 13 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (1982).
154. See 384 U.S. at 465 n.35. For a detailed discussion of this footnote, see
KAMISAR ESSAYS, supra note 138, at 217 n.94.
155. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 481 (1964).
156. See KAMISAR ESSAYS, supra note 138, at 217 n.94.
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landmark case, but I think it is a plausible and defensible one.
Speaking for six members of the Court, Justice O'Connor
observed:
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely
on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he
could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was
aware of the State's intention to use his statements to
secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the
waiver is valid as a matter of law.
• . Because the proposed modification ignores the
underlying purposes of the Miranda rules and because we
think that the decision as written strikes the proper
balance between society's legitimate law enforcement
interests and the protection of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights, we decline the invitation to further
extend Miranda's reach.
1 5 7
In any event, and more important for present purposes, did
the Burbine Court read Miranda the way Grano reads
Escobedo, or did it view Miranda quite differently? One may
plausibly read the passages from Escobedo quoted by Grano as
indicating that that case operated on the assumption that the
rights and needs of the suspect are paramount to all others.
But the Burbine Court viewed Miranda (quite properly, I
believe) as a case that rejected "the more extreme position"
urged by the ACLU and instead sought to strike a balance
between the need for police questioning and the need to
protect a suspect against impermissible compulsion. Observed
Justice O'Connor for the Court:
Miranda attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by
giving the defendant the power to exert some control over
the course of the interrogation. Declining to adopt the
more extreme position [advocated by the ACLU] that the
actual presence of a lawyer was necessary to dispel the
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation ... the Court
found that the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights could be
adequately protected by less intrusive means. Police
questioning . . could continue in its traditional form, the
157. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-24 (1986).
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Court held, but only if the suspect clearly understood that,
at any time, he could bring the proceeding to a halt or,
short of that, call in an attorney to give advice and monitor
the conduct of his interrogators.
...As any reading of Miranda reveals, the decision,
rather than proceeding from the premise that the rights
and needs of the defendant are paramount to all others,
embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully
protect both the defendant's and society's interests.
158
I realize that some might say that the Burbine Court's
characterization of Miranda is merely "revisionist history." I am
confident that that charge can be rebutted but it is hard to do
so without discussing and quoting at considerable length from
the Miranda opinion, the briefs, the oral argument, and the
contemporaneous literature. In brief, I can say this much: Long
158. Id. at 426-27, 433 n.4. Miranda's major weakness (or saving grace, depending
upon one's viewpoint) is that it permits suspects in police custody to waive their
rights without actually obtaining any guidance from counsel.
In oral argument, in the course of questioning a defense lawyer in a companion
case to Miranda, Justice Stewart suggested that a suspect "need[ed] a lawyer before
he could waive them [his rights]" and that a suspect could not waive his rights
'without the advice of counsel." See extracts from the oral argument in Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at 441, 443. The lawyer agreed that "this is
the worst place for waiver" because "[the party alleging waiver has control of the
party alleged to have waived." Id. at 443-44. Nevertheless, he concluded that the
suspect's rights could be waived without the advice of counsel, adding: "I think we
do have to recognize some of the realities of law enforcement." Id.
The ACLU amicus brief maintained repeatedly that effective protection of a
custodial suspect's rights required the "presence of counsel" (emphasis added), not
merely a warning as to the availability of counsel. See Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 67 n.47 (1966), reprinted in KAMISAR ESSAYS,
supra note 138, at 41 n.ll. Although the Court must have considered this
contention-it was heavily influenced by other portions of the ACLU brief-it rejected
it without any explicit discussion. This aspect of the case did not go unnoticed. For
example, the day after Miranda, ACLU spokesperson Aryeh Neier complained that
the case "doesn't go far enough" because "a person must have the advice of counsel
in order to intelligently waive the assistance of counsel." Kamisar, supra, at 67,
reprinted in KAMISAR ESSAYS, supra note 138, at 47-48.
For a forceful argument that the ACLU lawyers had the right idea and that "[a]ll
suspects in custody should have a nonwaivable right to consult with a lawyer before
being interrogated by the police," see Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the
Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987). See
also Frankel, supra note 148, at 529, maintaining that, because the Miranda Court
deemed a nonwaivable right to consult with a lawyer too great a blow to law
enforcement, "it was driven to stultify itself by leaving an opening which predictably
meant that the defendant who is naive, confused, unintelligent or careless would
confess to the police while others would not."
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before Burbine was decided, I viewed Miranda essentially the
same way the Burbine Court did.
159
WILL (SHOULD) THE COURT
OVERRULE MIRANDA?
Professor Grano recalls that shortly after Miranda was
handed down I reported that the decision had " 'evoked much
anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and
professors.' "16" Where, Grano wonders, have all those
judges, lawyers, and professors gone?16'
A major reason Miranda caused much anger and sorrow at
first is that many feared-as did the Miranda dissenters-that
the landmark decision would strike law enforcement a
grievous blow. Few press accounts of the case failed to quote
from Justice White's bitter dissent, in the course of which he
asserted:
The rule announced today will measurably weaken the
ability of the criminal law to perform [its] tasks.... There
is, in my view, every reason to believe that a good many
criminal defendants who otherwise would have been
convicted on what this Court has previously thought to be
the most satisfactory kind of evidence, will now ... either
not be tried at all or will be acquitted if the State's
evidence, minus the confession, is put to the test of
litigation.
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will
return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and
to the environment which produced him, to repeat his
crime whenever it pleases him .... The real concern is ..
[the impact of the decision] on those who rely on the
public authority for protection and who without it can only
engage in violent self-help.... There is, of course, a saving
factor: the next victims are uncertain, unnamed and
unrepresented in this case.'62
159. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 152.
160. Grano, Introduction, at 399 (quoting Kamisar, supra note 158, at 59).
161. See id. at 399-400.
162. 384 U.S. at 541-43 (White, J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
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No one could be sure what the effects of Miranda would be.
No less staunch a supporter of the Warren Court's "revolution"
in criminal procedure than A. Kenneth Pye warned at the time
that "[i]f the fears of the dissenters prove justified, it may be
necessary to reconsider whether society can afford the luxury
of the values protected and implemented in [Miranda]."'63
As twenty-five years of life with Miranda has demonstrated,
however, the Miranda dissenters' fears did not prove justified:
By the early 1970s, well before the Supreme Court began
trimming Miranda, the view that Miranda posed no
barrier to effective law enforcement had become widely
accepted, not only by academics but also by such promi-
nent law enforcement officials as Los Angeles District
Attorney Evelle Younger and Kansas City police chief
(later FBI Director) Clarence Kelly. Justice Tom Clark,
who filed an impassioned dissent in Miranda, later
confessed "error" in his "appraisal of [its] effects upon the
successful detection and prosecution of crime."164
dissenting). Justice Harlan, joined by Stewart and White, JJ., wrote a separate
dissent. Id. at 504. So did Justice Clark. Id. at 499.
163. Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v.
Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 219 (1966).
164. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 31, at 456; see also 0.
STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 168-200 (1973); Dripps,
Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 722 n.91 (1988); Herman, supra note 152, at 737
& n.31; White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1,
17-20 (1986)--especially Professor White's summary of empirical studies at 19 n.99.
But see Caplan, supra note 150, at 1464-66.
The best-known earlier studies are Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The
Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1571, 1589 (1967) (the Yale Study) (Miranda
warnings "had little impact" on suspect's behavior; "in almost every case" police had
adequate evidence to convict without interrogation); Office of the District Attorney,
County of Los Angeles, Results of Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's Office
of Los Angeles County Regarding the Effects of the Dorado and Miranda Decisions
upon the Prosecution of Felony Cases 3-4 (Aug. 4, 1966) (confession rates not reduced
by recent decisions; if a person "wants to confess," Miranda or Miranda-type
warnings are "not likely to discourage him"); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note
113 (rate of statements given to police "remarkably uniform" before and after
Miranda; "little has changed since Miranda"); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in
Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1 (1967) (confessions did drop
significantly after Miranda, but clearance and conviction rates remained virtually
unchanged).
Most of the empirical studies mentioned above, as well as some others, are
summarized and evaluated in A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 101-
49 (study draft no. 1, 1968), and in 0. STEPHENS, supra, at 168-200; see also L.
BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 180-81, 404-05 (1983).
The Office of Legal Policy Report does maintain that Miranda has had a major
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Professor Grano does not attempt to refute Professor
Stephen Schulhofer's assessment of Miranda's impact on law
enforcement. Nor does he challenge Professor Welsh White's
view that "[t]he great weight of empirical evidence supports
the conclusion that Miranda's impact on the police's ability to
obtain confessions has not been significant."'65  Indeed,
Grano takes no notice of any of the empirical studies relied on
by Schulhofer, White, and other commentators who have
reached similar conclusions.'66
More recently, a special committee of the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Section reported that "[a] very
strong majority of those surveyed-prosecutors, judges, and
police officers-agree that compliance with Miranda does not
present serious problems for law enforcement" and that "[p]ros-
ecutors, too, generally have little quarrel with Miranda.""7
Professor Grano does quote this language from the special
committee report, 6 ' but he does so without comment. He
never tells us whether he accepts or rejects the findings and
conclusions of this report.
Evidently Grano takes notice of this report for a very limited
purpose-to support his point that the anger and sorrow that
Miranda once evoked has now dissipated. But the special
committee report sheds some light on why the initial hostility
to Miranda has faded away.
Another reason that Miranda evoked more dismay in the
1960s than it does today is the confusion and uncertainty it
generated in its early years. For example, did it extend to
questioning "on the street"?" 9 Did it apply, or would the
adverse effect on law enforcement, see REPORT No. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION,
supra note 24, at 510-12, but I think that Professor Schulhofer effectively refutes this
contention. See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 31, at 457-58. He
points out that all three district attorney studies relied on by the Office of Legal
Policy recorded Miranda's effects "before police had an opportunity to adjust
interviewing methods and investigative practices to Miranda's requirements." He
notes, too, that the coauthor of the Pittsburgh study, the only academic study relied
on by the Office of Legal Policy, "emphatically denies that it provides support for the
Justice Department's claim of damage to law enforcement."
165. White, supra note 164, at 19 n.99.
166. See supra note 164.
167. SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 28-29 (1988).
168. See Grano, Introduction, at 400.
169. See Pye, supra note 163, at 212; see also Israel, Criminal Procedure, the
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1383
(1977) (footnotes omitted):
The police officers with whom I have spoken generally acknowledge that
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Court soon apply it, to a person interviewed in his own home
or office by an IRS agent?17 ° That uncertainty has largely
been dispelled. It is now fairly clear that absent special
circumstances (such as arresting a suspect at gunpoint or
forcibly subduing him), police questioning "on the street" or in
a person's home or office or "roadside questioning" of a
motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop is not "custodial";
as a general matter the Miranda doctrine has been limited to
the police station or an equivalent setting.'
17
If, as seems to be the current state of affairs, Miranda is not
adversely affecting law enforcement work to any significant
degree; the police have learned to "live with" that once much-
maligned and much-misunderstood case;172 the opinion has
not, to put it mildly, been given an expansive reading; and the
Court now views the decision as a serious effort to strike a
proper balance between the need for police questioning and
the importance of protecting a suspect against impermissible
compulsion, why overrule it?
As sociologists are fond of telling us, the instrumental effects
of governmental action may be slight compared to the response
which it entails as a symbol. The authors of the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Policy Report make no secret of
announcement of the Miranda warnings causes little difficulty if the warnings
requirement is limited to interrogation of arrested persons at the police station
or in similar settings (e.g., a patrol car). Difficulties have arisen primarily in
situations involving questioning "on the street." In those cases, it is difficult to
determine at what point the interrogation becomes custodial and thus requires
Miranda warnings.
170. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 676 n.25 (1968).
171. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 40, at § 6.6 (e), (f) (1984
& Supp. 1989); cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (warning
requirement need not be imposed on "normal consent searches" because they occur
on highways, homes or offices and "under informal and unstructured conditions"
"immeasurably far removed from 'custodial interrogation.'")
Indeed, as Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) and California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam) demonstrate, even police station questioning
designed to produce incriminating statements is not necessarily "custodial
interrogation." In Mathiason, the suspect went to the station house on his own after
an officer requested that he meet him there and he agreed to do so. 429 U.S. at 493.
Beheler is more troublesome because there the suspect was said to have "voluntarily
agreed to accompany" the police to the station house. 463 U.S. at 1122.
172. Indeed, some police have even grown to like it. Schulhofer, The Fifth
Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 950, 954 (1987), reports that
'support for Miranda runs high even in the law enforcement community, and news
stories about police reaction to the Justice Department report have carried such
headlines as 'Police Chiefs Defend Miranda Against Meese Threats' and 'Ed Meese's
War on Miranda Draws Scant Support.'"
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the fact that they are bent on toppling Miranda "because of its
symbolic status as the epitome of Warren Court activism in
the criminal law area."
173
Miranda is a symbol. But which way does that cut? As the
author of a book-length account of the case and its aftermath
has noted "[it was perhaps as a symbol that Miranda had the
most salutary impact."174 Symbols are important, especially
"the symbolic effects of criminal procedure guarantees"; "they
underscore our societal commitment to restraint in an area in
which emotions easily run uncontrolled."17' Even one of
Miranda's harshest critics recognizes that the case may be
seen as "a gesture of government's willingness to treat the
lowliest antagonist as worthy of respect and considera-
tion."1 76
Moreover, what does overruling Miranda entail? How could
the public forget a doctrine that has been part of the popular
culture for twenty-five years? How could the public forget that
a custodial suspect has certain rights and that the police are
supposed to advise him of those rights when that message has
been so frequently repeated in mystery novels, television
dramas and comic strips?
177
How can we tell the many police officers who have spent
their entire professional lives in the post-Miranda era to go
about their business henceforth as if the most famous criminal
procedure case in American history had never been decided?
(And what kind of message would that send?) How, in a
Miranda-less stationhouse, would (should) the police respond
if a suspect asks them whether she has to answer their
questions?
171
Would overruling Miranda, as Professor White fears, "convey
the message that restraints on police interrogation have been
largely abandoned"?7 s Or would the police, as Professor
173. REPORT No. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, supra note 24, at 565.
174. L. BAKER, supra note 164, at 407.
175. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 31, at 460; see also Maclin,
supra note 31, at 588-89 (1990); White, supra note 164, at 21-22.
176. Caplan, supra note 150, at 1471; see also L. BAKER, supra note 164, at 407.
177. See L. BAKER, supra note 164, at 404; Israel, supra note 169, at 1384.
178. Dissenting in Escobedo (as they were to dissent in Miranda), Justice White,
joined by Clark and Stewart, JJ., recognized that if a suspect "is told he must answer
and does not know better, it would be very doubtful that the resulting admissions
could be used against him." Escobedo v. Illinois, U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).
179. White, supra note 164, at 22.
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Israel suggests, continue to advise people of their rights
because "[e]ven without Miranda, an important factor in
determining whether a confession was voluntary would be
whether the warnings had been given?"' 0 Even if the police
would continue to give warnings in the event Miranda were
overruled, would they be the same Miranda warnings or some
abbreviated or diluted version? At this point in our history,
would overruling Miranda cause more confusion and uncer-
tainty than Miranda did in the first place?
Where, wonders Professor Grano, have Miranda's critics of
yesteryear gone? Maybe they haven't gone anywhere. Maybe
they have just grown older and wiser.
180. Israel, supra note 169, at 1386 n.283; see also Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 499
(White, J., dissenting): "When the accused has not been informed of his rights at all
the Court characteristically and properly looks very closely at the surrounding
circumstances. I would continue to do so."
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